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ABSTRACT 
Moral suffering occurs when employees feel constrained by organizational factors 
that are perceived as conflicting with their values. Moral suffering has been 
conceptualized through moral distress and moral injury, and while both terms have 
conceptually similar definitions, no study to date has empirically examined the distinction 
between the constructs. Thus, the current study examined the distinction between moral 
injury and moral distress, and whether perceived occupational stigma was a moderator of 
the relationship between moral suffering and mental health symptoms, meaningful work, 
and counterproductive work behaviors. Participants were 479 adults from 20 industries, 
who were recruited from Mturk to participate in the study at two time points. Results 
from the measurement model indicated a two-factor structure of witness- and 
perpetration-based moral suffering. The structural equation models indicated that 
witness-based moral suffering uniquely predicted higher mental health symptoms and 
lower meaningful work, while perpetration-based moral suffering predicted higher 
counterproductive work behaviors. The interactions between moral suffering and 
perceived occupational stigma predicting the outcomes exhibited evidence of 
suppression. The findings demonstrate that prior research may not be capturing the full 
domain of moral suffering by examining moral injury and moral distress separately. 
Results showed that both witness- and perpetration-based moral suffering predicted 
different factors that contribute to an individual’s wellbeing.  
Key words: Moral suffering, moral injury, moral distress, occupational stigma, 
wellbeing, mental health symptoms, meaningful work, counterproductive work behaviors 
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TRAUMA OR TRAPPED: CONCEPTUALIZING MORAL SUFFERING AND  
THE IMPACT OF OCCUPATIONAL STIGMA 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
A doctor who is constrained to stand by as a result of a Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) 
protocol, a journalist who must capture raw footage of war time events as a bystander, a 
television producer who receives emails from family members begging them not to air a 
show about their loved one’s murder, or a zoo keeper whose love of animals is conflicted 
with the regulation to put them in a small cage, all have one thing in common: moral 
suffering. When employees believe that the right course of action has not been taken or 
has been ignored by supervisors, coworkers, or organizational protocols, they may be at 
odds with their moral compass. While an employee is exposed to many stressors 
throughout a workday, stressors that contradict an employee’s sense of right and wrong 
can have detrimental effects on an employee’s emotional and cognitive wellbeing, 
especially when the distress is compounded over time. 
Moral Suffering refers to the emotional conflict that results from actions or 
exposure as part of one’s work obligations that violate their sense of right and wrong 
(Shay, 2011). ‘‘Morals’’ refer to the ethical principles or values held by individuals that 
are used to guide their behavior (“Morals,” 2021). Moral suffering has been investigated 
in prior research in two forms, moral injury and moral distress. Moral injury occurs as the 
“lasting psychological, biological, spiritual, behavioral, and social impact 
of…perpetrating, failing to prevent, or bearing witness to acts that transgress deeply held 
moral beliefs and expectations” (Litz et al., 2009, p. 700). These acts are often associated 
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with violence or death-related incidents (Litz et al., 2009). For example, Papazoglou and 
Chopko (2017) described a police officer who is bound by protocols to enforce harsh 
crowd management. While officers are instructed to do their job, they may not feel right 
about enforcing such harsh standards when it comes to a young child who is resisting. 
The officer may be bound by organizational constraints to act in a certain way, or 
alternatively, observe a coworker being forceful and hurting a child. These 
circumstances, whether acted upon themselves or by observing others, can make an 
officer question the justification of their required work duties. 
While moral injury has primarily been described through circumstances that 
involve exposure to violence or death-related incidents, moral distress has been referred 
to as the emotional experience that results from individuals making judgements or 
decisions about the right course of action but are unable to take them due to internal or 
external constraints (Corley, 2002; Jameton, 1984). These decisions that are made are 
judged as wrong, but work policy requires it to occur. For example, child welfare service 
employees pursue a career with the mindset of keeping children safe, however, 
employees have to make decisions about splitting families apart (Kahn, 2019). The 
employee may be required by regulations and state law to remove a child from a home, 
despite circumstances that the employee may feel is an exception, thus causing a conflict 
of decision making.  
The mismatch between one’s core beliefs and events that occur can create a threat 
to an individual’s internal moral schema (Dombo et al., 2013). The lack in meaning 
behind the individual’s experience can result in guilt and shame being associated with 
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situation and often manifests in rage, anxiety and depression (Currier, Holland, & Malott, 
2015; Dombo et al., 2013; Kruger, 2014). The conceptualization of both moral suffering 
components incorporate an appraisal in which many situations have the opportunity to 
cause moral suffering to occur, however, it is an individual’s evaluation of the event as 
being against their belief of what is right that causes moral suffering. 
Prior research has investigated the experience of moral suffering in regard to a 
variety of outcomes. Moral suffering has been linked to individual outcomes such as 
helplessness and pessimism (Bryan et al., 2016; Elpern et al., 2005), anger (Bryan et al., 
2016; Gutierrez, 2005; Haight et al., 2017; Stein et al., 2012), compassion fatigue (Austin 
et al., 2017; Maiden et al., 2011; Morley, 2003; Papazoglou et al., 2019), job satisfaction 
(Ando & Kawano, 2018; Elpern et al., 2005; Evans et al., 2018; Hatamizadeh et al., 2019; 
Joseph & Deshpande, 1997), burnout (Austin et al., 2017; Meltzer & Huckabay, 2004; 
Ohnishi et al., 2010; Piers et al., 2012; Sundin-Huard & Fahy, 1999), and turnover 
intentions (Austin et al., 2017; Haight et al., 2016; Hart, 2005; Piers et al., 2012). The 
impact of moral suffering goes beyond individual outcomes and can extend to the 
organization as well. Research has shown moral suffering can impact performance 
(Gutierrez, 2005; McAndrew et al., 2011; Piers et al., 2012; Radzvin, 2011), perceived 
quality of care of patients (Ganz & Berkovitz, 2012; Ludwick & Silva, 2003; Meltzer & 
Huckabay, 2004) and the professional environment (Berlinger & Berlinger, 2017; 
McAndrew et al., 2011). However, the majority of research has been primarily conducted 
with the military and healthcare professions, which presents a gap in knowledge of 
whether other occupations experience moral suffering and its consequences.  
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Purpose of the Current Study 
Despite the reference to conflict of moral values being at the core of moral injury 
and moral distress, research has not examined the constructs consistently. Some 
researchers have examined one of the constructs while ignoring the other, whereas other 
researchers refer to the constructs interchangeably as a single entity (Backholm & Idås, 
2015; Sugrue, 2019). No study to date has empirically examined the two constructs 
concurrently with the goal of assessing the shared and unique variability between the 
constructs. Additional research is needed to examine the uniqueness of the constructs and 
to understand the impact of moral suffering on the workforce. Research has shown the 
impact of moral suffering on many key organizational outcomes; therefore, organizations 
should be aware of the circumstances that may be causing their employees to leave the 
organization or industry. Knowledge of the presence and impact of moral suffering can 
provide a foundation for improvement for organizational change. To date, only two 
articles have suggested differing outcomes as a result of moral injury and moral distress, 
however, both were theoretical papers recommending research into the domain of moral 
suffering in helping professions (Papazoglou & Chopko, 2017; Sugrue, 2019). The 
current study extends the literature by proposing a model, demonstrated in Figure 1, that 
illustrates the proposed relationships between both moral suffering constructs and work 
outcomes; with the aim to investigate the unique variance that is explained by each 
factor. 
Additionally, the majority of research investigating moral injury has been 
conducted within the military context (Haight et al., 2016). Haight et al. (2016) 
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conducted a systematic review of the literature and found that within the 15% of research 
that was not with a military sample, only one study was focused on work. Similarly, 
moral distress has primary been researched within the healthcare field (Oh & Gastmans, 
2015; Sugrue, 2019; Weinberg, 2009). Authors have suggested the need for additional 
research into the area of moral suffering on diverse professions, however few occupations 
have been examined beyond healthcare and the military (Williamson et al., 2018; 2020). 
While moral suffering may be more obvious in military and healthcare contexts, research 
is lacking in the understanding of other work environments that could contribute to the 
psychological distress that moral suffering creates. Without the knowledge of how moral 
suffering may occur in one’s industry, organizations may be proposing changes that are 
inadequate to addressing the moral conflicts that employees are experiencing. Time, 
effort and money may be wasted on interventions that are not addressing the key issues at 
hand. The present study aims to address these gaps. 
While the purpose of the current research was to examine the generalization of 
moral suffering to all occupational fields, it is unlikely that all occupations are affected 
equally. Individuals with a greater perception that they work in a stigmatized occupation 
may be more affected by events that transgress against their beliefs than individuals with 
a lessor perception of stigma. For example, garbage truck workers, a stigmatized 
occupation, is proposed to have stronger reactions to events that transgress their beliefs in 
comparison to employees who perceive low occupational stigma. The shame and guilt 
that results from the belief that a violation of ethical behavior has occurred, in 
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combination with perceived negative appraisal from outsiders may compound the 
dysfunctional outcomes individuals experience. 
Many individuals gain a sense of purpose from their work, and thus work serves a 
major part of their identity (Dik & Duffy, 2009). However, humans are not siloed 
creatures; individuals seek validation and approval from their peers, which contributes to 
their personal evaluation of their worth (Ashforth, 2001; Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Leary, 
2007). Evaluations of worth can be derived from the perceptions of oneself, perceptions 
of social groups, and perceptions of society. While an employee may believe in the 
greater good that their job plays in society, others may not have the same perspective, and 
these differential perspectives can influence an individual’s perception of worth.  
Many researchers have conducted qualitative research demonstrating the 
awareness employees have regarding the perception of stigma that is associated with their 
work (Davis, 1984; Gold, 1964; Levin & Arluke, 1987; McIntyre, 1987; Ouellet, 2010; 
Palmer, 1978; Perry, 1978; Petrillo, 1990; Rollins, 1985; Stephens, 1974; Thompson, 
1991). Whether outsiders actually believe the stated perception, individuals experience 
‘paranoid social cognition,’ where they tend to ruminate on false perceptions from others, 
which can cause suspicion and distrust regarding others’ intentions (Kramer, 1998). 
Benjamin et al. (2011) found that members of stigmatized occupations, specifically 
cleaners in their study, preferred to hide who they worked for in order to avoid the social 
criticism. In order to overcome the perceptions of the public, many individuals who work 
in stigmatized occupations tend to rely on the support of coworkers and the justification 
of the purpose of their work (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2014). However, when actions of 
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ingroup members or organizational factors contradict one’s sense of right and wrong, 
such as in moral suffering, individuals are more likely to feel disidentified with their 
work (Ashforth & Kreiner, 2014; Kreiner et al., 2006; Lai et al., 2013). Figure 1 
illustrates the proposed relationships between moral suffering and mental health 
symptoms, meaningful work, and counterproductive work behaviors, moderated by 
perceived occupational stigma. 
Based on the lack of consensus on the conceptual definition, measurement, and 
occupations impacted by moral suffering, the current study aimed to address three goals. 
The first aim was to extend the literature on moral suffering to examine the frequency 
and intensity of moral injury and distress in a wide range of professions. Secondly, the 
current study examined the distinction between moral injury and moral distress, both 
conceptually and statistically, and whether the constructs predicted different outcomes 
uniquely. Finally, the third aim was to examine the role of perceived occupational stigma 
on the proposed relationships. The extent to which an individual perceives their 
occupation is stigmatized may magnify the effects of moral suffering on mental health 




CHAPTER TWO: MORAL SUFFERING LITERATURE REVIEW 
Moral suffering occurs when an individual’s moral integrity is perceived to be at 
stake (Kelly, 1998). Moral integrity has been described as “living up to one’s personal 
moral code, so that one can sleep at night, or live with oneself, having demonstrated 
courage, patience, and perseverance in the face of conflict” (Laabs, 2011, p. 431). 
Human’s seek validation and perceive their sense of self-worth comes from clear values 
that are congruent with one’s actions and perceptions (Hardingham, 2004). Value system 
theory states that an individual’s values and value system motivate their behavior 
(Rokeach, 1973). When individuals perceive that they must go against their value system, 
conflict occurs. Corley et al. (2001) suggested that conflict stems from the need for 
autonomy, where individuals seek “the power to do what one recognizes should be 
done”, but can not follow through with that decision or action (p. 251). When the 
situation hinders an individual’s ability to act in accordance with their value system, they 
gain a sense of powerlessness, and moral suffering may occur. 
In the workplace, many stakeholders play a role in organizational decision 
making. Therefore, decisions made and actions taken by employees do not occur in a silo; 
internal and external constraints can form a barrier that impedes an individual’s ability to 
act in accordance with their values. When an individual holds internal beliefs about the 
way work should be conducted, and they or those around them act in an opposing 
manner, the tension that arises puts in question one’s sense of moral integrity. Internal 
constraints can include perceived power to influence the outcome such as lack of 
knowledge, fear of losing one’s job, self-doubt, or conflict aversion (Hamric et al., 2006; 
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Haug, 2018; Weinberg, 2009). External constraints that promote conflict can be team 
member power imbalances, poor communication, pressure to reduce costs, fear of legal 
action, and policies that conflict with patient/student needs (Haug, 2018; Jameton, 1993). 
Consistent with many stressor-strain theories propose, moral suffering is a result 
of an individual’s particular appraisal of the stressor. Moral suffering is a specific 
example of the Transactional Theory of Stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) applied to 
individuals considering the implications of situations as going against their beliefs. The 
Transactional Theory of Stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) states that individuals 
appraise the situation first, determining whether they perceive the stressor as challenge or 
a threat to their wellbeing. Not every individual will appraise the same situation the same 
way. An event that may conflict with one individual’s values or perceived obligations 
may be interpreted differently by another, and therefore the second individual may not 
interpret a threat to their moral integrity and internal conflict will not occur (Epstein & 
Delgado, 2010). Thus, moral suffering is a result of the interaction between the situation 
and the individual’s evaluation of the transgression. Two different types of transgressions 
have been examined to a great extent, moral distress and moral injury. 
Moral Distress  
Philosopher Andrew Jameton (1984) first conceptualized the experience of moral 
distress in the clinical ethics literature. He described moral distress as "when one knows 
the right thing to do, but institutional constraints make it nearly impossible to pursue the 
right course of action" (Jameton, 1984, p. 6). Jameton (1984) suggested that individuals 
feel a sense of responsibility by participating in the event and are unable to influence the 
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outcomes based on the restricted circumstances, which leads to internal conflict. 
Wilkinson (1987) refined the definition to a “psychological disequilibrium and negative 
feeling state experienced when a person makes a moral decision but does not follow 
through by performing the moral behavior indicated by that decision” (p. 16). Wilkinson 
(1987) noted that the failure to follow through or fight against the perceived immoral 
event is not based on an individual’s irresponsibility but on institutional constraints 
limiting their ability to do so, and thus includes the aspect of moral judgement, as well as 
decision making, since most of the time individuals were unable to act on their 
judgements (Jameton, 1984).  
 Based on Wilkinson’s (1987) critiques and development of knowledge on moral 
distress, Jameton (1993) developed his conceptualization further. Jameton (1993) 
suggested that there were two underlying processes that both he and Wilkinson were 
referring to. Jameton (1984) stated his early conceptualization referred to the initial 
conflict that an individual experiences, which he referred to as ‘initial’ stress. Jameton 
(1993) stated that initial stress occurs when an individual “feels frustration, anger, and 
anxiety when faced with the institutional obstacles that conflicts with their values” (p. 
544). The immediate frustration and sense of conflict with personal values that the 
individual experiences, is initial distress. The employee believes they know the correct 
action to take but are unable to due to the risk involved in speaking up, possible 
unpleasantness, extra work, and cooperation of higher management to overturn the 
decision. Individuals feel a moral responsibility in the situation, however, often cannot 
handle the additional burden of fighting the system (Jameton, 1993). 
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After the initial stress occurs, Jameton (1984) clarified that Wilkinson’s (1989) 
definition was referring to the aftermath of the event, ‘reactive distress’. Reactive distress 
is the compounded distress that results from not acting or changing the results of the 
initial distressing event, causing guilt, anxiety and shame (Jameton, 1993). Wilkinson 
(1989) had described crying, depression, nightmares, feelings of worthlessness, heart 
palpitations, diarrhea and headaches as some of the effects of morally distressing events 
(Wilkinson, 1987, p. 23). Reactive stress involves thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that 
occur as a result of the initial stress event.  
Since its first conceptualization, researchers have continued to refine the 
definition of moral distress. Corley et al. (2005) described the “painful feelings and/or 
psychological disequilibrium that occurs when nurses are conscious of the morally 
appropriate action a situation requires but cannot carry out that action because of 
institutionalized obstacles” such as institutional policies, lack of time, and professional 
protocols (p. 382). Crane et al. (2013) suggested an expansion of the current definitions 
to “distress that occurs as a consequence of the transgression of one’s personal moral and 
ethical frameworks, irrespective of how such transgressions emerge” (p.2). Webster and 
Baylis (2000) broadened the definition to include failing to pursue a course of action, 
“when one fails to pursue what one believes is the right course of action (or fails to do so 
to one’s satisfaction)” (p.15). As the discrepancies between these definitions shows, 
Hamric (2012) and Lützén and Kvist (2012) have critiqued the literature on moral 
distress as having a lack of agreement in numerous definitions across studies. 
Moral Residue  
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Evidence has suggested that repeated exposure to moral distress can increase the 
adverse impact of distress over the course of time. Jameton (1993) originated the concept 
of the ‘lingering’ effects of moral distress as reactive distress, however researchers have 
investigated and recognized the unique adverse effects of reactive distress and moral 
residue differ (Epstein & Hamric, 2009). Whereas reactive distress is the emotional toll 
that the morally distressing event takes on an individual’s wellbeing, moral residue is the 
rise in moral sensitivity as a result of repeated moral distress. Webster and Bayliss (2000) 
conceptualized the term ‘moral residue’ as the lasting psychological impact of moral 
distress from repeated exposure. Webster and Bayliss (2000) stated that moral residue is 
what “each of us carries with us from those times in our lives when in the face of moral 
distress we have seriously compromised ourselves or allowed ourselves to be 
compromised” (p. 208). The more morally distressing events an individual experiences at 
work, an increased “moral wound of having had to act against one’s values remains” 
(Epstein & Delgado, 2010). 
 Epstein and Hamric (2009) progressed the knowledge of moral residue further by 
describing the ‘Crescendo Effect.’ Each time an individual experiences a morally 
distressing event, the individual experiences a ‘moral distress crescendo’ where the 
emotional experience of moral distress builds up, perhaps starting as frustration but then 
progressing into symptoms of trauma such as anxiety or nightmares. Even when the 
distressing situation has resolved or over time the specific situation may have faded in 
perceived importance or relevance, the emotional toll does not go back to baseline. 
Instead, moral residue forms a new baseline for when the individual experiences a 
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morally distressing event and the impact of moral distress is increased through increased 
level of residual moral distress (Epstein & Delgado, 2010). Epstein and Delgado (2010) 
state that moral residue rises gradually having a cumulative effect as morally distressing 
events that occur in particular settings where individuals work, tend to be similar over 
time. Thomas and McCollough (2014) stated that “while each episode may seem 
manageable, their cumulative effect may not be” (p. 115). Epstein and Hamric (2009) 
described the consequences of moral residue as emotional numbing to the ethically 
challenging situations, conscientious objecting, and burnout. 
Moral Distress Distinctions  
While there exists a considerable amount of research on moral distress, key 
distinctions between components of moral distress have been ignored. One important 
distinction to make within the moral distress framework is between the frequency and 
intensity of moral distress. Prior researchers have inconsistently defined and measured 
moral distress by adapting existing measures to suit the correct audience, and this 
inconsistent use of measurement tools likely contributes to the differing effect sizes in 
outcomes (Hamric, 2012). Epstein and Delgado (2010) stated “because values and 
obligations are perceived differently by various members of the healthcare team, moral 
distress is an experience of the individual rather than an experience of the situation” (p. 
4). Therefore, the frequency of moral distress refers to the amount of exposure an 
individual has to various situations that are likely to conflict with one’s morals. In 
contrast, the intensity of moral distress is referred to as the degree to which the morally 
distressing situation has inflicted distress, or a troubled conscience (Glasberg et al., 
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2006). While the frequency of morally distressing events can increase moral distress, the 
degree to which an individual appraises the event as being against their beliefs is what 
causes a stress response to occur. It is important to acknowledge the differences between 
the two components of moral distress, as researchers have found that the events that 
occur most frequently are not always the situations that cause the greatest level of distress 
(Corley, 1995; Corley et al., 2001; McAndrew et al., 2011). 
Past research has demonstrated how these two perspectives can differ in the 
prediction of outcomes (Corley, 2002; Ganz & Berkovitz, 2012; Mobley et al., 2007; 
Ohnishi et al., 2010). Ohnishi and colleagues (2010) measured both the frequency and 
intensity of moral distress and found that although psychiatric nurses reported a high 
frequency of morally distressing situations, they reported low levels of intensity of moral 
distress. Their findings indicate that the frequency of moral distressing events did not 
always determine the intensity of moral distress and the findings suggest that differing 
underlying factors may increase the intensity felt. In order to be clear and consistent, the 
current study will refer and measure the frequency of exposure as the occurrence of 
morally distressing events, and the disequilibrium felt as an outcome to those events will 
be referred to as moral distress. 
The second key distinction that is not often clarified within the moral distress 
literature is the referent of cause. Research has defined moral distress as being an event 
where the individual is either forced to make a decision or constrained out of a decision 
based on external factors. The occurrence of moral distress then is a result of either 
individuals themselves perceiving that they must act in a way that is against their moral 
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beliefs or standby and observe others, such coworkers or management, act in a way that 
conflicts with their beliefs. Researchers vary on the extent to which they incorporate both 
types of referent in their measurements, but research suggests key differences in 
outcomes due to the referent in the situation. 
For example, prior work has suggested that one of the leading causes of moral 
distress for nurses is being required to carry out unnecessary tests and treatments (Corley, 
1995). Researchers have suggested that nurses feel conflicted as they perceived 
themselves as being in a better position to understand the patients’ needs as they typically 
spend more time by the bedside, which may conflict with the physician’s treatment plan 
(Hamric & Blackhall, 2007). In these situations, nurses do not have the power to 
influence a decision but are bound by authority or protocol to act in a way that is against 
their beliefs. Similarly, nurses report moral distress as a result of the provision of 
aggressive care that is not seen as beneficial to the patient (Corley et al., 2005). The 
nurses describe observing physicians or other nurses treating the patient in a way they do 
not agree with but cannot intervene as a result of team cohesion, lack of confidence, or 
organizationally stated procedures. Jameton (1993) described how moral distress is most 
often a result of an individual’s sense of moral responsibility to the situation. He stated 
that whether the individual was making the decision themselves, or having to witness 
others, they feel an obligation to do what’s right as a participant in the situation. It is this 
conflict between what they perceive as right and what is actually done that leads to 
feelings of guilt and shame. 
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The concept of moral distress resembles constructs such as ethical dilemmas and 
role conflict, however, researchers have stated there are differences among each 
conceptual framework. Jameton (1993) distinguished the concept of moral distress from 
moral or ethical dilemmas, stating that moral dilemmas occur when two ‘different and 
important values conflict, but no choice presents itself that preserves both’ (Jameton, 
1993, p. 542). Moral or ethical dilemmas can have two opposing decisions, where neither 
option is more beneficial than the other but each “can be defended as viable and 
appropriate” (Weinberg, 2009, p. 144). In contrast, moral distress occurs when an 
individual makes a moral judgment about a case in which he or she is involved and the 
institution or co-workers make it difficult or impossible for the [individual] to act on that 
judgement” (Jameton, 1993, p. 542). Moral distress occurs as the individual feels 
responsible for making or complying with an unethical decision because they feel as 
though they are restricted by circumstance (Corley, 2002; Weinberg, 2009). Jameton 
(1993) stated that medical schools often discuss the concepts of moral dilemmas, and not 
moral distress, as dilemmas can teach students the choice making system. However, 
moral distress implies ‘wrongdoing’ and questioning the bureaucracy, social issues and 
leadership within the healthcare system (Epstein & Delgado, 2010; Jameton, 1993). 
Researchers have also clarified the difference between moral distress and role 
conflict. House and Rizzo (1972) defined role conflict as the stress that results from 
multiple competing or conflicting expectations. Where role conflict deals with the 
competing demands directed by different authorities, an individual may be conflicted 
about who to respond to or what tasks have priority, but the situation does not involve a 
17 
 
decision in which the employee believes wrong or against their value system. Moral 
distress involves the internal conflict of what they are required to do, versus what they 
feel they should do. 
Previous Research on Moral Distress 
The moral distress literature has incorporated various definitions, referents, and 
related constructs. However, one aspect that has remained consistent is the focus on the 
healthcare industry. In a review of the literature from 1987 to 2018, over 750 published 
articles discuss moral distress, however, all but four were published in medical journals 
(Sugrue, 2019). Research has been conducted within many healthcare professions such as 
physicians (Austin et al., 2017; W. Austin et al., 2005; Hamric & Blackhall, 2007), 
nurses (Austin et al., 2017; Corley et al., 2005; Hamric & Blackhall, 2007; Hatamizadeh 
et al., 2019; Ludwick & Silva, 2003), including psychiatric nurses (Ando & Kawano, 
2018; Ohnishi et al., 2010), critical care nurses (Asgari et al., 2019; Corley, 1995; Elpern 
et al., 2005; Haghighinezhad et al., 2019; Maiden et al., 2011; McAndrew et al., 2011; 
Meltzer & Huckabay, 2004; Mobley et al., 2007), correctional nurses (Sasso et al., 2018), 
geriatric nurses (Piers et al., 2012), surgical nurses (Ganz & Berkovitz, 2012), nurse 
educators (Duarte et al., 2017), neonatal intensive care units (Cavaliere et al., 2010), 
humanitarian workers in a healthcare setting (Hunt, 2008), occupational therapists (Penny 
et al., 2016), pharmacists (Sporrong et al., 2005), respiratory therapists (Schwenzer & 
Wang, 2006), and anesthetists (Radzvin, 2011). See Sugrue (2020) and Hanna (2004) for 
a full review. 
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Studies have reported that some of the highest predictors of moral distress were 
feeling compelled to provide care that seems ineffective (Austin et al., 2017), lack of 
resources (Kälvemark et al., 2004), perceived organizational justice (Haghighinezhad et 
al., 2019), unwarranted aggressive treatment (Hamric & Blackhall, 2007), high security 
protocols providing a lack of perceived autonomy (Hunt, 2008; Sasso et al., 2018), 
conflicts of interest (Kälvemark et al., 2004), and issues with perceived distrust in the 
employee’s competence (Hunt, 2008; Pergert et al., 2019; Sasso et al., 2018). Self-
criticism and self-blame are major factors in how the individuals judged their actions 
against “their moral convictions and their standards of what a good nurse would do” 
(Kelly, 1998, p. 1134).  
In much of the literature, nurses are the primary sample of interest. Researchers 
have found that nurses are often portrayed as victims, being bound by the decisions and 
authority of higher physicians who are seen as instigating ‘aggressive care’ (Hamric & 
Blackhall, 2007; Prentice et al., 2016). However, other researchers have found that nurses 
who had more authority are exposed to more demands and thus may be more likely to be 
morally sensitive and increase their likelihood for moral distress in comparison with 
nurses with less authority (Ohnishi et al., 2010). 
 Despite the wide variety of healthcare professions represented within the moral 
distress literature, very few have explored the impact of moral distress outside of the 
healthcare profession (Hanna, 2004; Sugrue, 2019). Researchers have theorized and 
requested a call to action to investigate fields such as social work (Weinberg, 2009) and 
police officers (Papazoglou & Chopko, 2017), however they did not empirically test their 
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theory. Other samples that have been assessed include social workers (Kuip, 2016; Lev & 
Ayalon, 2018), teachers (Meierstein Ford, 2006; Vehviläinen et al., 2018), and student 
affairs personnel (Haug, 2018). However, these studies were bound by small samples 
sizes and cross-sectional analyses. 
Interestingly, some empirical research exists beyond the scope of healthcare, but 
researchers have failed to specifically define the domain of research as ‘moral distress.’ 
Instead, research has examined ‘moral challenges’ with veterinarians (Crane et al., 2015; 
Moses et al., 2018), ‘paradoxical psychological demands’ experienced among child 
welfare agency workers (Kahn, 2019), and moral identity with teachers (Santoro, 2013). 
While Jameton (1984) originally theorized the construct of moral distress within the 
healthcare domain, it is unlikely that the internal conflict between personal and 
professional values would be limited to only the healthcare professions. Weinburg (2009) 
suggested the rationale for the predominance of research being conducted in healthcare 
could be a result of the dramatic and concrete consequences of moral distress, such as 
patient pain and death, which are more clear than outcomes faced by other professions.  
However, employees in many professions are bound by professional and legal 
factors that may not always serve the best interests of their clients, customers, or the 
outcomes of the work. For example, marketing agents who must develop content for 
products they believe are unsafe, bank tellers who must enforce discriminatory loan 
agreements, or sales workers who are encouraged to deceive their clients may also 
experience moral distress. Popular press articles have featured examples of moral distress 
such as, “Roger Boisjoly, 73, Dies; Warned of Shuttle Danger” (Martin, 2012). Roger 
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Boisjoly was an engineer who adamantly warned leadership about the dangers of 
launching the Challenger shuttle, however, his warnings were ignored, and the shuttle 
exploded. Roger Boisjoly experienced moral distress from his inability to influence the 
launch decision despite having the knowledge he thought was neccessary. The findings 
from previous work within the healthcare field could be applied more broadly with other 
industries, replacing ‘patient’ with the audience an employee serves. The fact that moral 
distress has not been looked at past the healthcare field is a concern for organizational 
science. Employees may be experiencing these moral stressors regularly and not be 
provided the resources and aid that they require, increasing the risk to poor organizational 
outcomes.  
Outcomes of Moral Distress 
 Researchers have been interested in outcomes of moral distress ever since 
Jameton’s (1984) book, ‘Nursing Practice: The Ethical Issues’ suggested that when 
individuals feel opposition between their personal and professional values, engagement 
would be disrupted. Kuip (2016) and other researchers have supported this claim, finding 
that social workers who experienced high moral distress showed less enthusiasm, 
inspiration and vigor towards their role (Lawrence, 2011; Mason et al., 2014). Other 
research has found direct links from increased moral distress to lower job, career and 
income satisfaction (Ando & Kawano, 2018; Hamric & Blackhall, 2007; Hatamizadeh et 
al., 2019; Schluter et al., 2008; Schwenzer & Wang, 2006).  
High levels of moral distress have also been significantly related to secondary 
traumatic stress and burnout in physicians and nurses (Austin et al., 2017; Maiden et al., 
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2011). Meltzer and Huckabay (2004) found that moral distress accounted for 10% of the 
variance in emotional exhaustion but was not related to the depersonalization or personal 
accomplishment dimensions of burnout. Interestingly, the researchers only found this 
significant relationship between moral distress frequency but not intensity. However, in 
contradiction to these results, Ohnishi et al. (2010) found that nurses with high frequency 
and intensity of moral distress experienced higher levels of both emotional exhaustion 
and cynicism. In another qualitative study of child welfare agency workers, researchers 
found that employees attempted to protect themselves from the impact of moral distress 
by avoiding thoughts about the event, resulting in reduced emotional availability to their 
clients and coworkers, emotional exhaustion and isolation (Kahn, 2019). 
While moral distress begins as an internal struggle, consequences outside of the 
individual have also been examined. Researchers have found nurses with higher moral 
distress had lower satisfaction with quality of care (Hamric & Blackhall, 2007), poor 
respect for patient rights (Hatamizadeh et al., 2019), and increased perception of medical 
errors (Maiden et al., 2011) and quality of care (Fogel, 2007; McAndrew et al., 2011). 
Additionally, McClendon and Buckner (2007) found that nurses reported that their 
experience of moral distress influenced their professional practice due to burnout, 
difficulty focusing, having little patience, and feeling ineffective as a nurse. However, 
one study found that nurses reported that moral distress did not affect the care they 
provided, but the majority of participants admitted they were less involved with the 
patient’s family (Gutierrez, 2005).  
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Moral distress has also been associated with team dynamics. Research has 
demonstrated that moral distress can have an impact on a work team due to lower 
perception of collaboration (Hamric & Blackhall, 2007) and increased distrust of 
coworker competency for care (Cronqvist & Nyström, 2007; Fogel, 2007). Specifically, 
one study found that the intensity of moral distress was significantly related to physician-
nurse relationship quality and the frequency of moral distress was predictive of perceived 
leadership and support, participation in hospital affairs, collegial relationships, and 
staffing adequacy (McAndrew et al., 2011). Implications of these studies are evident, as 
internal conflict that an individual feels influences outcomes beyond just the individual.   
One of the most common outcomes investigated by researchers has been the 
association between moral distress and the intentions to leave one’s position (Austin et 
al., 2017; Corley, 1995; Fernandez-Parsons et al., 2013; Hamric & Blackhall, 2007; 
Hatamizadeh et al., 2019; Kuip, 2016; Penny et al., 2014; Piers et al., 2012; Sasso et al., 
2018; Schwenzer & Wang, 2006, 2006). In one study, researchers found that 45% of 
participants reported having left or considered leaving their position because of the moral 
distress that they had experienced (Hamric & Blackhall, 2007). These results have been 
supported in a sample of emergency nurses, finding that 6.6% of the nurses attributed 
moral distress as the reason for leaving a previous position, 20% said that they had 
considered leaving a position but did not, and 13.3% stated that they are currently 
considering leaving their position (Fernandez-Parsons et al., 2013).  
Summary of Moral Distress  
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The moral distress literature has exponentially increased over recent years, 
expanding knowledge and application cross culturally from the United States to Australia 
(Crane et al., 2015), Belgium (Piers et al., 2012), Japan (Ohnishi et al., 2010), Israel 
(Ganz & Berkovitz, 2012), Sweden (Pergert et al., 2019; Sporrong et al., 2005), Finland 
(Mänttäri-van der Kuip, 2016), and Iran (Hatamizadeh et al., 2019). However, despite 
being seen across the globe, research on moral distress has not been unified.  
Researchers continue to argue for new and developed definitions and models of 
moral distress, with not much agreement on a single model to move forward with. 
Researchers argue that definitions are missing important components and there is lack of 
consistency across the conceptual frameworks, however it may be that some authors are 
incorporating aspects of similar constructs like moral injury which potentially 
contaminates findings and implications. Thus, the present study used, Corley’s (2002) 
definition of “the psychological disequilibrium that occurs when [individuals] are 
conscious of the morally appropriate action a situation requires, but cannot carry out that 
action because of institutionalized obstacles” (p. 382). Previous work examining moral 
distress has limited scope outside of the healthcare industry (Kahn, 2019; Kuip, 2016; 
Papazoglou & Chopko, 2017). As a result, much of what is known about moral distress 
may have limited transferability to external professional roles. However, many 
occupations experience similar situations of institutional constraints that question the 
bureaucracy, leadership, and social issues beyond health care. A similar trend of limited 
empirical knowledge outside of one industry has also been found with the research of 




Similar to moral distress, moral injury describes the experience of when an 
individual is faced with a situation that transgresses against their deeply held beliefs. 
However, in contrast to moral distress, moral injury involves situations of actions or 
violence that lead to harm of other individuals, rather than judgement of decision making. 
In the books ‘Achilles in Vietnam: Combat trauma and the undoing of character’ (Shay, 
1994) and ‘Odysseus in America: Combat trauma and the trials of homecoming’ (Shay, 
2003), Jonathon Shay described moral injury as one of the adverse effects of war. Shay 
(2003) portrayed moral injury as situations where “there has been a betrayal of what’s 
right, by someone who holds legitimate authority, in a high-stakes situation” (Shay, 2003, 
p. 240). Moral injury was said to occur as a result of individuals receiving and obeying 
“authorized yet immoral orders” and observing horrors of war (Hodgson & Carey, 2017). 
Many researchers have proposed similar conceptualizations that expand on Shay’s 
(2003) original definition to varying degrees. Drescher et al. (2011) described moral 
injury as the “disruption in an individual’s confidence and expectations about one’s own 
or others’ motivations or capacity to behave in a just and ethical manner” (p. 9). Other 
researchers have similarly defined moral injury as, “the damage done to our moral 
fiber…[which] sacrifice[s] our moral integrity” (Boudreau, 2011, p. 749), “a wound in 
the soul” (Brock & Lettini, 2011, p. 1), which “overwhelm[s] one’s sense of goodness 
and humanity” (Sherman, 2015, p. 8). The major theme that exists throughout the 
proposed definitions is how moral injury harms the person’s sense of other people and 
how the world operates. The events that transgress their beliefs, cause the individual to 
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lose faith in humanity and their beliefs in a just-world (Drescher et al., 2011). 
Researchers have found that rumination of the event and lack of self-forgiveness for 
one’s involvement, leads to moral injury (Litz et al., 2009).  
One of the most cited adopted definitions has been provided by Litz et al. (2009), 
who defined moral injury as “the lasting psychological, biological, spiritual, behavioral, 
and social impact of perpetrating, failing to prevent, or bearing witness to acts that 
transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations” (p. 695). The authors refined the 
original definition to be applicable more broadly and specifically to situations that 
transgress one’s beliefs. The authors state that actively participating in or witnessing 
cruel actions and failing to prevent those cruel acts can conflict with one’s moral values. 
Litz et al. (2009) suggested that moral transgressions interfere with an individual’s 
personal expectations about the way in which individuals should behave. As a result, 
individuals question themselves, and those around them, as to why a situation was able to 
occur, resulting in guilt and shame from participating in the event. When individuals are 
unable to integrate events into their mental schemas (views of the world), they will 
experience “guilt, shame, and anxiety about potential direct personal consequences” (p. 
698).  
Since its first conceptualization, numerous authors have continued to develop and 
refine the concept of moral injury (see Hodgson & Carey, 2017). In their review of the 
literature, Hodgson and Carey (2017) compared researchers’ definitions and concluded 
that research has refocused from Shay’s (2003) original description of the target of 
distress being those in ‘legitimate authority’ to “focusing specifically upon the behavior 
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of the individual - who may or may not be impacted by leadership or organizational 
decisions” (p. 1214). Where Shay (2003) emphasized the perceived betrayal in the failure 
of leadership (‘authority’), researchers have since adapted the definition to focus on the 
perceived failure of the individual as a result of leadership, where an act that the 
individual engaged in or failed to prevent (as directed by leadership), is perceived as 
morally ‘wrong.’ One of the core concepts of moral injury inherent in many of the 
definitions is the perceived betrayal that an individual feels. Betrayal stems from the 
individual feeling forced to act in a way that is against their beliefs, resulting in 
perceptions of disloyalty and distrust from the person, protocol or power that enforced the 
order. As a result, many researchers have suggested the conceptual framework includes 
differences in moral injury that includes actions by self, actions by others, and betrayal. 
Moral Injury Residue 
While moral injury has been heavily investigated within the military, no empirical 
data has been examined on the residue that may occur from moral injury. Unlike the 
moral distress literature, where researchers have conceptually defined moral residue as a 
result of accumulated moral distress and the crescendo effect (see prior section), the 
moral injury literature has not specifically addressed the increased likelihood of being 
effected by moral transgressions. However, studies have suggested similar phenomena 
may occur. In their findings from police officers who were exposed to chronic trauma, 
McCormack and Riley (2016) described a domino effect in the officer’s reports of 
diminishing self-worth and described the occurrence as the ‘eroded identity’ over time.  
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Further, Litz et al. (2009) described how poor integration of events and one’s 
moral schema leads to lingering psychological distress. The researchers discussed that 
over time, individuals convince themselves that their actions are unforgiveable, leading to 
rumination about one’s participation in the event. Failing to avoid these thoughts, 
individuals tend to engage in withdrawal and self-condemnation behaviors, replicating 
symptoms of PTSD (reexperiencing, avoidance, and emotional numbing). Therefore, it is 
likely that as individuals experience moral injury over time, moral residue and the 
crescendo effect may still occur. 
Moral Injury Distinctions  
Similar to the literature on moral distress, prior researchers have distinguished 
between the outcomes that results from the frequency and intensity of transgressions that 
occur. The term ‘potentially morally injurious experiences (PMIES)’ has been used by 
many researchers to refer to the event that precedes the appraisal process (Bryan et al., 
2016; Currier, Holland, Drescher, et al., 2015; Drescher et al., 2011). Many researchers 
have measured moral injury with the assumption that specific events are tied to adverse 
outcomes (Currier, Holland, Drescher, et al., 2015; Nash et al., 2013). However, exposure 
to questionable events does not necessarily lead to adverse outcomes for every individual. 
For example, two employees may be restricted from helping a coworker in a dangerous 
situation, however only one may feel guilt from not intervening and aiding the coworker. 
In their review of the literature, Griffin et al. (2019) concluded that “exposure to 
potentially morally injurious events should not be equated with morally injurious 
outcomes, per se” (p. 356). Research findings have shown that the appraisal of the event 
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is a key determinant of whether the individual will experience morally injurious 
outcomes. Preliminary evidence has suggested that measures of exposure to PMIEs are 
less strongly associated with mental and behavioral health problems than instruments 
designed to assess morally injurious outcomes, such as guilt associated with the event 
(Currier et al., 2018; Koenig et al., 2018).  
The second distinction that researchers have made within the literature is the 
referent of who engaged in the morally injurious action. Inherent in almost all of the 
moral injury definitions is the idea that individuals either witness or perpetrate acts that 
transgress deeply held beliefs (Carey et al., 2016; Litz et al., 2009). Researchers have 
continuously stressed the importance of other versus self-engaged morally injurious 
events, stating that while both lead to moral injury, unique underlying processes may 
occur for the two sources (Drescher et al., 2011; Jordan et al., 2017; Litz et al., 2009). For 
example, Stein et al. (2012) found that ‘moral injury by self’ was the best predictor of 
severity of reexperiencing symptoms and two out of three dimensions of guilt (hindsight 
bias/responsibility, and wrong doing), however, ‘moral injury by others’ only predicted 
state anger. Additionally, Papazoglou et al. (2019) found that perpetrating morally 
injurious events uniquely predicted compassion fatigue and PTSD symptoms, whereas 
witnessing morally injurious events was not a significant predictor in their sample. 
However, other researchers have found conflicting results. Bryan et al. (2016) found that 
witnessing morally injurious was most strongly associated with posttraumatic stress and 
perpetrating morally injurious events was most strongly associated with hopelessness, 
pessimism, and anger. Nonetheless, while research has found conflicting results of which 
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morally injurious dimension is the strongest predictor of outcomes, evidence is clear that 
unique effects occur for witnessing verses perpetrating the event themselves. 
The final key distinction that is important to note within the moral injury literature 
is the conceptual similarities with constructs such as post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD). While there are similarities in the concepts, researchers have theoretically and 
empirically distinguished the two (Dennis et al., 2017; Farnsworth et al., 2019; Griffin et 
al., 2019; Litz et al., 2009). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) recognizes that PTSD is a “syndrome of 
emotional, behavioral, and cognitive symptoms including intense anxiety, nightmares, 
hyperarousal, and flashbacks that are triggered by exposure to traumatic external events”. 
The DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) holds that the “essential feature” of 
the disorder is “exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor” which is limited to an event 
where death or serious physical injury is threatened (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013, p. 463).  
While PTSD can result from experiencing natural disasters (e.g., forest fires or 
hurricanes), or manmade crises (e.g., war), moral injury predominately results from 
manmade crises as interpersonal violence is volitional behavior that can be evaluated as 
transgressing moral beliefs. Moral injury occurs to the extent that humans are responsible 
for the bad actions that occur. During a natural disaster, moral injury would only result 
from human action that was perceived as morally wrong following the event, such as 
intentionally failing to help others who have been harmed; whereas interpersonal 
violence always involves human action from the start. For example, individuals who 
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experience wartime violence may experience PTSD symptoms due to witnessing and/or 
engaging in violent behavior, however violence and killing are ‘expected’ in war as a 
normative part of the solider experience. When the violence involves questioning 
ethically correct actions, such as those involving children or innocent bystanders, can 
lead to moral injury. It is the subjective interpretation of the meaning that is attributed to 
actions and observations, that contributes to the result of moral injury (Litz et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, Litz et al. (2009) summarized that when traumatic events occur, an 
individual who experiences PTSD feels dissonance about threats to their wellbeing. 
Whereas moral injury occurs when the individuals are faced with trauma but cannot 
comprehend the justification behind the action as being the ‘right course of action.’ 
Other researchers, such as Dennis et al. (2017), described how outcomes of moral 
injury are predictive of PTSD symptoms; thus, moral injury may be a precursor to PTSD. 
Research has shown that associations between morally injurious experiences and PTSD 
have ranged from small to moderate (Currier, Holland, Drescher, et al., 2015; Currier, 
Holland, Rojas-Flores, et al., 2015; Nash et al., 2013). Dennis et al. (2017) stated that 
when individuals experienced war time atrocities that they believed violated their 
standards of what was acceptable, they felt increased guilt associated with the event. 
However, it was when individuals were unable to come to terms with their guilt that they 
experienced the PTSD symptoms of reexperiencing the event, avoidance and 
hyperarousal (Dennis et al., 2017). 
Litz et al. (2009) provided an in-depth examination of the construct distinctions 
and stated that a possible reason for the limited amount of research in the area of moral 
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injury (at that time) was due mental health professionals associating military members 
with the focus on life-threating trauma typical of war, and failing to pay sufficient 
attention to the impact of events with moral and ethical implications. Litz et al. (2009) 
also stated that clinicians who sense moral conflict in their client may associate moral 
violations as being outside the realm of their expertise, recommending religious 
counseling instead. However, as research developed in the area of moral injury, it is clear 
psychologists should be aware of the impact both on the individual and organizational 
outcomes. In summary, moral injury is not a syndrome or disorder in itself, however, it 
can be viewed as accompanying or a precursor to PTSD symptomology.  
Morally Injurious Events  
The development of knowledge of the impact of moral injury has primarily been 
conducted within the military setting. Researchers have assessed war veterans (Currier, 
Holland, & Malott, 2015; Currier, McCormick, & Drescher, 2015; Dennis et al., 2017; 
Evans et al., 2018; Ferrajão & Aragão Oliveira, 2016, 2016; Ferrajão & Oliveira, 2014; 
Vargas et al., 2013; Worthen & Ahern, 2014), active duty military (Bryan et al., 2014; 
Bryan et al., 2013, 2016; Stein et al., 2012), armed forces intelligence personnel (Ogle et 
al., 2018), deployed nurses and physicians (Conway, 2013; Gibbons et al., 2013), 
deployed healthcare and religious professionals such as chaplains, academic researchers, 
and policymakers (Drescher et al., 2011). Within the military, soldiers are frequently 
exposed to morally injurious events due to the nature of work. Moral injury occurs as 
violence extends outside of what is perceived as ‘normal wartime behaviors,’ and 
individuals develop negative self-appraisals which can influence their self-identity and 
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cause emotional withdrawal and poor mental wellbeing (Dombo et al., 2013). Moral 
injury stems from feeling remorse about one’s own behavior or feeling guilty for being 
associated with the actions of others (Litz et al., 2009). Qualitative studies with clergy, 
mental health providers, and Vietnam veterans have shed light on the sources of moral 
injury. In one study, clergy and mental health providers described acts of betrayal; acts of 
disproportionate violence inflicted on others; incidents involving death or harm to 
civilians; and within ranks violence (Drescher et al., 2011; Gibbons et al., 2013; Vargas 
et al., 2013). The researchers also found that moral injury was linked to increased social 
problems such as isolation or aggression; trust issues such as problems with intimacy; 
spiritual changes including loss of faith; existential issues such as fatalism or sorrow; and 
negative views of self (Drescher et al., 2011; Gibbons et al., 2013; Vargas et al., 2013).  
Currier, McCormick and Drescher (2015) have suggested four clusters reflecting 
different circumstances within which morally injurious events may occur: organizational 
circumstances, such as when leadership is perceived as out of touch with work; 
environmental circumstances, such as having difficulty identifying threats or civilians; 
cultural and social circumstances, such as dehumanizing the enemy, and psychological 
circumstances, such as having a revenge mindset, contribute to how an individual 
develops moral injury. 
Despite the widespread examination of moral injury research amongst the 
military, few researchers have established justification for moral injury outside of the 
military domain. Studies have included nonmilitary samples of teachers (Currier, 
Holland, Rojas-Flores, et al., 2015; Sugrue, 2020), police officers (Komarovskaya et al., 
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2011; Papazoglou et al., 2019), child protective system personnel (Haight et al., 2017), 
and journalists (Backholm & Idås, 2015; Browne et al., 2012). Other researchers have 
suggested that moral injury is relevant to first responders (Benedek et al., 2007), teachers 
(Keefe-Perry, 2018; Levinson, 2015), prison staff, supermarket personnel and delivery 
drivers and frontline workers of the Coronavirus pandemic (Williamson et al., 2020). 
However, empirical data has not yet been provided to support these claims. 
Many authors have critiqued the limited settings that moral injury research has 
been conducted. Authors have argued that “moral injury may be applied beyond the 
battlefield to nonmilitary clients who also experience the emotional effects of their own 
actions that violate the dictates of their moral compass” (Dombo et al., 2013, p. 198; 
Griffin et al., 2019; Williamson et al., 2018, 2020). Empirical evidence supports these 
claims that moral injury may be found in other occupations. In one study of child 
protective service workers, employees had increased rates of moral injury due to under-
resourced systems, problematic professionals, unfair laws and policies, abusive parents, 
an adversarial system, systemic biases, harm to children by the system and poor-quality 
services. In their systematic review, Williamson et al. (2018) found that there were no 
significant differences in outcomes associated with moral injury between military and 
nonmilitary professions. In other words, combat exposure was not necessary in order for 
individuals to experience moral injury. The studies involving veterinarians, journalists 
and teachers were just as likely to experience moral injury as those in the military. 
Therefore, while the majority of what is known about moral injury stems from the 
military, research suggests this is only one occupation in which moral injury may occur. 
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Further research is needed to examine the widespread application of moral injury beyond 
the battlefield and whether all occupations experience moral injury universally.  
One of the rationales for why moral injury is commonly researched in the military 
is that violence is evident within the context of war and thus moral injury should be easier 
to acknowledge and recognize. However, Neria and Pickover (2019) suggested that 
although civilian workers may not experience morally injurious experiences to the same 
degree as military personnel, betrayal and violence can occur in any human interaction at 
work, and should be examined to understand the clinical applications to the general 
working public. Other professions may not explicitly have violence and killing within 
their job descriptions; however, many jobs involve aggressive behaviors. For example, 
police officers, corrections officers, and the secret service all engage in behaviors with 
protection, at whatever cost, of their workplace. These professions may be exposed to 
situations where an employee must engage in physical violence that they do not 
necessarily agree with, however, they may be held accountable, pulled from their 
position, or hurt themselves if they do not act in a physical manner. 
Previous Research on Morally Injurious Events 
Past research has examined the impact that perceived betrayal and conflict cause 
for individuals. The main outcomes of morally injurious experiences are guilt and shame 
for participation in the event (Currier et al., 2018; Litz et al., 2009). Researchers have 
described that guilt stems from internal conflict resulting from a misalignment of one’s 
behavior and values, whereas shame is a social construct where behaviors are perceived 
as violating others’ sense of right and wrong (Litz et al., 2009). Currier et al. (2018; 
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2015) and others have suggested that a central process for how morally injurious 
experiences contribute to problems is through meaning making (Koenig et al., 2018). 
When individuals cannot justify the rationale for their actions or those of others, 
dysfunctional outcomes are more likely. Most commonly, and as a result of the 
predominance in military samples, researchers have found strong associations between 
morally injurious experiences and depression (Currier, Holland, & Malott, 2015; Currier, 
Holland, Rojas-Flores, et al., 2015; Ferrajão & Oliveira, 2014; Komarovskaya et al., 
2011), PTSD (Backholm & Idås, 2015; Barnes et al., 2019; Browne et al., 2012; Bryan et 
al., 2016; Ferrajão & Oliveira, 2014; Komarovskaya et al., 2011; McCormack & Riley, 
2016; Ogle et al., 2018; Papazoglou et al., 2019; Worthen & Ahern, 2014). suicidal 
idealization and attempts (Bryan et al., 2014; Bryan et al., 2013; Maguen et al., 2011; 
Wisco et al., 2017). 
 Feelings of guilt and demoralization have had much stronger associations with 
PTSD than combat exposure and abusive violence (Laufer et al., 1985). Henning and 
Frueh (1997) found that guilt accounted for 30% of the unique variance in a composite of 
reexperiencing and avoidance symptoms and 8% of the unique variance in overall PTSD 
severity. In their meta-analysis, Williamson et al. (2018) found that within thirteen 
studies conducted on moral injury, moral injurious experiences accounted for 9.4% of the 
variance in PTSD, 5.2% of the variance in depression and 2.0% of the variance in 
suicidality. 
Moral injury can also affect trust between coworkers. Jinkerson (2016) stated that 
betrayal of trust was one of the core symptoms of moral injury and that trust contributes 
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to loss of trust in oneself, others, existential dread and demoralization (Koenig et al., 
2018; McCormack & Ell, 2017). Koenig et al. (2018) and Currier et al. (2018) also found 
a moderate negative relationship between moral injury and social support, as assessed 
through the perceived quality of relationships and involvement in community activities. 
Further, McCormack and Riley (2016) found that all participants in their study (N=7) 
disconnected from their family and friends to varying degrees to avoid the shame 
associated with morally injurious events. Evidence has shown that shame has caused 
military and police samples to resort to self-destructive behaviors such as substance abuse 
(Currier et al., 2018; Maguen et al., 2011; McCormack & Riley, 2016; Tripp et al., 2016), 
and social isolation (Currier et al., 2018; McCormack & Riley, 2016; Pasillas et al., 
2006). The association with morally injurious events causes military personnel to push 
away their family and friends as a result of resentment to feeling misunderstood in their 
experiences (Ferrajão & Aragão Oliveira, 2016; Ferrajão & Oliveira, 2014; Worthen & 
Ahern, 2014). Others have also demonstrated the impact of moral injury on ruptured 
social bonds (Currier et al., 2018; Nash & Litz, 2013). Specially, Nash and Litz (2013) 
found a moderately strong negative correlation between exposure to potentially morally 
injurious events and social support.  
Bryan (2016) found that individuals expressed hopelessness, pessimism, and 
emotional numbing due to increased moral injury. These emotions have been applied to 
the workplace, where morally injurious experiences have been associated with 
compassion fatigue (Papazoglou et al., 2019), burnout (Sugrue, 2020) and intentions to 
leave one’s job (Sugrue, 2020). In two studies involving social workers and teachers, 
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nearly a third of all professionals described themselves or colleagues as actively seeking 
employment elsewhere (Haight et al., 2017; Sugrue, 2020). Evidence is mixed as to 
whether exposure to morally injurious events is associated with aggressive behaviors at 
work (Currier et al., 2018; Maguen et al., 2009; Worthen & Ahern, 2014). However, 
evidence suggests that impulsive or counterproductive behaviors may occur as a result of 
self-contempt in participating in a morally injurious event (Currier et al., 2018; Maguen 
et al., 2009). In their study of veterans, Maguen et al. (2009) found that 13% of the 
variance in functional impairment was predicted by killing noncombatants, even after 
controlling for general war combat. Specifically, Haight et al. (2017) described in their 
study a sample of CPS personnel who struggled to behave in an ethical and moral manner 
within the system that they viewed as deeply flawed. Morally injurious experiences 
should be a concern for organizations based on these outcomes. 
Summary of Moral Injury  
Prior research has demonstrated the adverse effects of individual wellbeing as a 
result of morally injurious experiences. However, with the lack of knowledge coming 
from the workplaces of the general public, research is limited in the implications to 
organizationally relevant behavior. The implications of moral injury are clear as the 
construct has been observed globally in samples from El Salvador (Currier, Holland, 
Rojas-Flores, et al., 2015), Finland (Papazoglou et al., 2019), Britain (Browne et al., 
2012), Australia (McCormack & Riley, 2016), Norway (Backholm & Idås, 2015), 
Portugal (Ferrajão & Aragão Oliveira, 2016), and Israel (Levi-Belz et al., 2020). 
However, research is needed within other domains, beyond the battlefield. 
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Researchers have suggested that other professions are likely to experience guilt, 
shame, and betrayal of trust as a result of morally injurious experiences in the workplace. 
Understanding that moral values can conflict with work requirements and influence an 
individual’s sense of self, others, and the world around them will allow researchers and 
practitioners to understand employee reactions. As Litz et al. (2009) summarized, shame 
is fundamentally experienced through the anticipated negative evaluation by others, 
therefore, it is not surprising that individuals who feel ashamed being exposed to morally 
injurious events have the desire to hide or withdraw.  
Summary of Moral Suffering  
The existence of moral suffering is evident. Researchers have attributed the 
internal conflict of moral values of judgements and actions frequently to the military and 
healthcare domains. Many researchers have debated the definitions and measurement of 
moral distress and injury independently, however no research to date has acknowledged 
the similar moral appraisal of situations as being in the same nomological network of 
moral suffering (Papazoglou & Chopko, 2017; Sugrue, 2019). Both components involve 
the cognitive and emotional processes that an individual experiences when a conflict 
relates to a violation of moral expectations in the way matters should occur at work 
(Jameton, 1984; Litz et al., 2009).  
It is clear that both components of moral suffering involve the conflict between 
one’s beliefs of the right course of action but are unable to influence the circumstance. 
However, where moral distress is a result of individuals feeling ‘trapped’ by individual or 
organizational constraints, moral injury involves trauma and atrocities that violate one’s 
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beliefs of what actions are necessary (Jinkerson, 2016; Papazoglou & Chopko, 2017; 
Sugrue, 2019). Additionally, while moral distress occurs from the feeling of being forced 
to do something at work that one finds morally wrong, the result is a sense of 
helplessness in the specific situation but one’s world view remains intact. An individual 
feels guilt and shame from being pressured into decisions that are made and thus would 
contribute to a negative evaluation of oneself. Whereas the resulting effect of 
experiencing moral injury causes an individual to question their sense of a just world and 
the other people in it. An individual perceives that harmful events occurred at work as a 
result of themselves or others allowing harm to occur, and thus result in external negative 
attributions. 
Papazoglou and Chopko (2017) and Sugrue (2019) have begun to illustrate the 
overarching construct of moral suffering in the helping professions, describing the 
various situations where moral injury and moral distress uniquely occur. Some 
occupations may be exposed to more of one component of moral suffering than another, 
however researchers need a clear and consistent conceptualization of the constructs in 
order to adequately address the implications. While some outcomes associated with moral 
injury and distress may be similar, such as guilt and shame, other outcomes may be 
unique as a result of the key differences between the constructs. Actions relating harm 
and violence may resonate more in reexperiencing and rumination in the events resulting 
in PTSD and counterproductive work behaviors, whereas situations that comprise of 
morally wrong judgements may be associated more with outcomes such as hopelessness, 
compassion fatigue and loss of meaningful work.  
40 
 
The current study contends that moral suffering is the overarching term for moral 
injury and distress using empirical support. Researchers have examined both constructs 
but have failed to assess the unique influences each construct may have on outcomes of 
interest (Papazoglou & Chopko, 2017; Sugrue, 2019). Additionally, researchers have 
cross contaminated measures by including components of injury in distress measures and 
distress in injury measures. For example, in Currier et al.’s (2015) measure of moral 
injury, the authors state the questions cover five broad domains including “ethical and 
moral conflicts” (p. 56). Additionally, in Lev and Ayalon’s (2018) measure of moral 
distress, the researchers include numerous questions describing abuse and physical harm. 
In order to understand whether workplace hinderances and trauma that transgresses 
against one’s core beliefs are distinct underlying constructs, the current study examined 





CHAPTER THREE: PERCEIVED OCCUPATIONAL STIGMA 
People naturally categorize themselves and others into groups, as classifications 
provide information about others, and contribute to an individual’s sense of belonging, 
self-esteem and pride (Tajfel & Turner, 1985). Individuals can classify themselves 
through identification with their job, organization, or industry. Social Identity Theory 
suggests that individuals develop an identity based on their group memberships that 
contributes to an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ mindset (Tajfel & Turner, 1985). This mindset explains 
various reactions and behaviors that individuals engage in, based on their perceived 
social standing. The perception about one’s classification within a group can lead to 
perceived occupational stigma. No mater whether outsiders of the group actually believe 
in the stereotypes associated with the group, individuals who perceive negative 
evaluations made by others may experience adverse effects on their wellbeing. The 
current study assesses the relationship between perceived occupational stigma and 
dysfunctional outcomes and investigates how perceived occupational stigma may 
magnify the relationship between moral suffering and those outcomes. 
Researchers have defined perceived occupational stigma as the perception that 
outsiders of the organization perceive their work as physically, psychologically, or 
morally tainted and of lesser value (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; E. C. Hughes, 1951; 
1958). Individuals generally seek to maintain a positive image of the social groups to 
which they belong (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Tajfel & Turner, 1985), including their 
occupation. As a result, individuals may engage in paranoid social cognition, where they 
are hyperaware of their professions ‘status’ or the public’s stereotypes of their work and 
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will seek to counter those stereotypes. Paranoid social cognition triggers hypervigilance 
and rumination of social misperceptions and misjudgments and thus could lead to 
enhanced negative outcomes for the individual (Kramer, 1998). This can be problematic 
as individuals are challenged with maintaining their self-esteem while being associated 
with the stigmatized occupational status (Bentein et al., 2017).  
According to Affective Events Theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), when 
individuals associate negative emotions with their work, these emotions can interfere 
with an individual’s health and work behaviors. Research has demonstrated the impact 
that stigma can have on depression (Benoit et al., 2015; Carlson et al., 2017; McCoy & 
Major, 2003), emotional exhaustion (Bentein et al., 2017), maladjustment (Kamise, 
2013), self-esteem (Boyce et al., 2007; McCoy & Major, 2003), engagement (Bentein et 
al., 2017; Kamise, 2013), and occupational identification (Schaubroeck et al., 2018; 
Shantz & Booth, 2014).  
Researchers have also suggested that negative emotions held towards work may 
increase the likelihood of withdrawal and counterproductive work behaviors (Boyce et 
al., 2007; Fox et al., 2001; Schaubroeck et al., 2018; Shantz & Booth, 2014; Urick et al., 
2018). Counterproductive work behaviors are actions that employees engage in that are 
harmful to organizational stakeholders and counter to organizational goals (Robinson & 
Bennett, 1995). In one study comparing housekeepers (a stigmatized profession), to non-
housekeepers, the researchers found strong evidence linking the housekeeper’s 
perceptions of stigma was associated with engaging in counterproductive work behaviors 
(Urick et al., 2018). However, in contrast to previous authors who have suggested that 
43 
 
negative emotions lead to engaging in counterproductive work behaviors (Fox et al., 
2001), Urick et al. (2018) found that their sample of housekeepers had ‘limited emotions’ 
(neither high nor low affect), which caused the housekeepers to emotionally disconnect 
from their job duties and perform deviant behaviors. Interestingly, the authors suggested 
that different stigmatized occupations may engage in different types of counterproductive 
work behaviors based on the impact the actions have on the worker. 
Alternatively, other researchers have found that individuals attempt to counteract 
the ‘taint’ they perceive through developing occupational ideologies and social buffers 
(Ashforth et al., 2007). Research has suggested that perceived occupational stigma leads 
to negative outcomes because it causes the individual to question their self-views and 
their relationship to the marginalized group (Shantz & Booth, 2014). Self-views are an 
important process in how individuals understand their purpose in society and experience 
meaningful work. When an employee has an increased sense of meaning in their work, 
they can minimize the negative effects of perceived occupational stigma by rationalizing 
what they do as having a purpose in society. Researchers have suggested that all workers 
are capable of fostering a sense of meaning from work, regardless of their occupational 
status (Bailey & Madden, 2017; Lips-Wiersma et al., 2016; Shim, 2016). However, the 
sense of meaningfulness is typically described as occurring as ‘episodes’ rather than 
general perceptions about work for stigmatized groups (Bailey & Madden, 2017; 
Mercurio, 2020; Shim, 2016). This has important implications, as individuals may find 
meaning in some of their work duties, some of the time, however, individuals may not 
associate their work in general as being meaningful. These findings contribute to the 
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various outcomes that are associated with perceived occupational stigma; individuals who 
do not perceive meaning at a given time may be more likely to experience dysfunctional 
outcomes. In a sample of custodial workers, Mercurio (2020) found that experiencing 
meaninglessness at work amplified stigma's negative influence on perceptions of oneself 
and the work that they do. 
 In addition to finding meaning in work tasks, social buffers have been reported as 
coping mechanisms to counteract the taint associated with the stigma. Social buffers are a 
form of a social network where an individual’s form a ‘clique’ of workers in their 
profession that insulates the worker from the effects of the public’s view (Ashforth et al., 
2007). Individuals use this group as a form of validation of their work; gaining a sense 
that they are not alone. Ashforth et al. (2007; 2014) suggested that this group membership 
encourages individuals to rely more on fellow occupational members as sources of social 
validation than other professions, as stigmatized workers are less able to receive support 
outside of their occupation. 
However, researchers have also noted a concern for individuals who lack the 
social wall and occupational ideology that buffers the taint from affecting an individual. 
Ashforth et al. (2007) stated that individuals who lack a social buffer “would likely find it 
more difficult to maintain their occupational esteem…trigger[ing] various negative 
individual and organizational outcomes” (p. 160). Therefore, troubling events that take 
place at work, such as moral suffering, that cause an individual to feel ashamed or 
betrayed by occupational group members, break down the meaning associated with one’s 
work and the social buffer to which they rely on. This breakdown of coping mechanisms 
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is likely to increase the risk of moral suffering to an individual’s wellbeing and contribute 
to the likelihood of retaliation behaviors. The present study addressed the link between 
moral suffering and perceived occupational stigma on outcomes with the belief that the 
interaction between violations made at work and a heightened perception of stigma will 
negatively affect an individual’s mental health, sense of meaningful work, and may lead 







CHAPTER FOUR: PROPOSED HYPOTHESES 
As previous researchers have suggested, knowledge is needed on the clarification 
of moral injury and moral distress as being separate but related constructs. Past 
researchers have used the terms interchangeably or inaccurately and assessed the 
constructs inconsistently. While there is a general agreement that not every individual 
will perceive moral suffering from an event, researchers have measured the constructs by 
confounding the frequency of experiences with the intensity of emotional turmoil in 
many measures of moral suffering. Additionally, the referent to which the moral event 
results from, whether an individual is either a witness to someone else’s immoral actions 
or a perpetrator in which they felt obligated to act in such a way, could shed light on the 
way in which outcomes occur. The current study aimed to address the inconsistencies in 
the assessment of outcomes and clarify the concept of moral suffering. Based on the 
moral suffering measurement model, the factors that were extracted served as the 
dimensions of moral suffering in subsequent analyses.  
Further, with minimal research conducted on moral suffering in occupations other 
than healthcare and the military, organizations may be unaware of the internal struggle 
employees may be facing (Haight et al., 2017; Williamson et al., 2018). Many 
professions and industries must abide by legal, professional, and organizational standards 
in which morally threatening events can arise. As most participants in military research 
are male, and the majority of participants within the healthcare domain are female, 
understanding of the constructs may be limited by the gender representation within the 
professions (Williamson et al., 2018). Therefore, the current study extends the moral 
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suffering literature by studying a sample that is diverse, both with regard to gender and 
occupation. 
Additionally, a review of the literature demonstrated a need for an in-depth 
examination of the construct of moral suffering without a reliance on cross-sectional 
design inferences. Williamson and colleagues (2018) reported that within their meta-
analytic review of the literature on moral injury, 12/13 articles were cross sectional. The 
research investigating moral distress has followed a similar pattern (Ando & Kawano, 
2018; Asgari et al., 2019; Elpern et al., 2005; Haghighinezhad et al., 2019). Past 
researchers have also called for an assessment of other risk factors and instrumental 
moderator variables that may affect mental health outcomes over time. Much of the 
literature is limited to medical and war related outcomes, providing a gap in knowledge 
of outcomes that may occur in the general workforce. While concepts such as PTSD and 
turnover are relevant to the general workplace, other outcomes are needed to broaden the 
understanding of moral suffering.  
The present study documented the experience of moral injury and moral distress 
in a broad range of occupations in the United States. Thus, the current study proposed 
three goals; (a) Extend the literature on moral suffering to examine the frequency and 
intensity of moral injury and distress in a wide range of professions; (b) Examine the 
distinction between moral injury and moral distress, both conceptually and statistically, 
and examine whether the constructs predict different outcomes uniquely; and (c) 
Examine the role of occupational stigma, and the association of an individual to a 
stigmatized occupation may magnify the effects of moral suffering.  
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Through the Conservation of Resources Theory, the relationships of moral 
suffering on outcomes can be theoretically explained. According to Conservation of 
Resources Theory, individuals are motivated to preserve and maintain personal resources 
(Hobfoll, 1989). Personal beliefs and values such as honesty, integrity, and ethics can be 
considered personal resources and when those resources are threatened, distress can 
occur. Research has supported the notion that moral suffering is associated with the loss 
of personal and professional integrity (Carpenter, 2010; Hardingham, 2004; Kelly, 1998). 
Further, in their conceptualization of moral residue, Webster and Baylis (2000) suggested 
that with continuous violation of deeply held beliefs, values and principles, individuals 
continue to experience distress even when the situation is no longer occurring. Moral 
residue is an exemplar of conservation of resources theory’s loss spirals which contribute 
to the continuous loss of resources and leads to further loss (Hobfoll, 1989).  
Research has shown the impact that stress can have over time. If individuals are 
continuously exposed to situations that make them question their belief system, this can 
create uncertainty and fear in their global perceptions of the world. The shame and guilt 
associated with moral suffering can affect perceptions of oneself and the emotional 
processing of the event (Kruger, 2014). Challenging one’s belief system and a perceived 
inability to overcome the obstacle can lead depression and anxiety. Research has 
continuously investigated the symptoms of moral injury and moral distress on depression 
and anxiety (e.g., Colville et al., 2019; Dombo et al., 2013; Lamiani et al., 2018; Litz et 
al., 2009; Wolf et al., 2016), however, no study has examined the unique variance that 
moral distress and injury that may contribute to the onset of mental health symptoms. 
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Mental health has been the main area of concern in the moral suffering literature, so to 
uncover whether the constructs are examining unique features of the work environment, 
the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H1(a-b): Moral suffering assessed at Time 1 will be associated with increased 
mental health symptoms at Time 2; Both (a) Moral injury and (b) moral distress 
will predict unique variance in mental health symptoms. 
Kopacz et al. (2019) described moral suffering as the “psychological wound” as a 
result of meaning making from stressful events. Research has examined the difficulties in 
meaning making as a mediator of how events increase the risk of psychological 
symptoms (Currier, Holland, & Malott, 2015; Kopacz et al., 2019). Individuals construct 
meaning through interpretation of events in ways that are congruent with ones pre-
existing beliefs, when those events conflict, an individual takes on responsibility or blame 
for the event (Kopacz et al., 2019). Thus, when employees observe actions or decision 
making that appears to contradict with the purpose they believed in, an employee can lose 
their sense of meaning in work. Moral distress can uniquely impact the meaning an 
individual derives from work as an individual who is drawn to a certain profession may 
experience circumstances where they are prohibited from achieving that goal. Similarly, 
moral injury is a result of exposure to violence and harm, which can alter beliefs about a 
just world which causes a “breakdown in global meaning” (Currier, Holland, & Malott, 
2015). While moral distress may cause an individual to experience a decrease in 
meaningful work due to restriction in the ability to serve their ‘purpose’, moral injury 
exposes individuals to violence that leads to questioning own’s confidence and 
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expectations about their own’s and other’s actions (Dombo et al., 2013). Thus, the 
following hypotheses are proposed: 
H2(a-b): Moral suffering assessed at Time 1 will be associated with decreased 
meaningful work at Time 2; Both (a) Moral injury and (b) moral distress will 
predict unique variance in meaningful work. 
Additionally, organizational justice research has shown that when individuals 
disagree with work processes or believe that decisions made were unfair, the individual 
can react by ‘getting even’ with the organization by engaging in counterproductive work 
behaviors (CWB; Ahmed & Khan, 2016). Individuals perceiving that judgements or 
decisions are against what is right, may interpret the event as unfair. Antecedents of 
counterproductive work behaviors are similar to the outcomes associated with morally 
distressing events; individuals who feel violated by decisions decrease the trust 
relationship between the individual and the organization and decreases their sense of 
control. Research suggests that individuals who feel disrespected, not heard, or 
undervalued are more likely to retaliate. Behaviors such as coming in late, misusing 
resources, and being disobedient can signal that the employee is not satisfied with the 
way work is currently conducted (Dalal, 2005). The disruption of perceived morality in 
events can cause individuals to question their confidence in the system and diminishes 
“their capacity or behave in a just and ethical manner” (Drescher et al., 2011, p. 9).  
Research has begun to investigate the extent to which those suffering from PTSD 
may resort to unethical behavior (Blumberg et al., 2018; LaMotte & Murphy, 2017). 
Prior work provides justification as research has suggested moral injury as a precursor to 
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PTSD. One of the few distinctions between morally distressing and injurious experiences 
is that moral injury seems to capture the sense of betrayal by others at work. Feelings of 
betrayal encourage individuals to engage in CWBs in sabotage, theft, or aggressive 
behavior (Fisher & Baron, 1982; Greenberg, 1990; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Morally 
injurious experiences may evoke stronger feelings of anger and betrayal to retaliate 
against individuals within the organization and engage in CWBs. Thus, the following 
hypotheses are proposed: 
H3(a-b): Moral suffering assessed at Time 1 will be associated with increased 
counterproductive work behaviors at Time 2; Both (a) Moral injury and (b) moral 
distress will predict unique variance in counterproductive work behaviors. 
 While many professions are exposed to morally questionable events, some 
professions may be more at risk for suffering than others. Researchers have suggested 
that shame is intensified when an individual experiences moral suffering and it may be 
due to the social standing of one’s job role. While guilt causes an individual to question 
the justification of an event, shame encourages an individual to escape and hide due to 
social norms (Kubany & Manke, 1995). Researchers have suggested that individuals who 
perceive they work in stigmatized occupations are often negatively impacted by the 
perceptions of society (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; Kreiner et al., 2006). Individuals who 
perceive they work in stigmatized occupations may experience worse outcomes of moral 
suffering than other occupations. 
Researchers have demonstrated that individuals who perceive they work in a 
stigmatized occupation are often concerned with their relationships with outsiders 
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(Bolton, 2005; Ghidina, 1992; Tracy, 2004). Social Identity Theory (Abrams & Hogg, 
1990; Tajfel & Turner, 1985) and research on paranoid social cognition suggest that 
individuals are aware of their categorization within society (e.g., their profession or 
industry) and perceived stigma associated with that categorization can lead individuals to 
have increased sensitivity to how they are evaluated by others (Dutton et al., 1996; 
Kramer, 1998). Haug (2018) found that the public perception and pressures surrounding 
student affairs personnel increased their moral distress. Additionally, Mak and Cheung 
(2012) found that caregivers of individuals with mental illness who had a strong face 
concern (the desire to preserve social image and social worth associated with one’s job 
role) internalized the perceived stigma, which increased psychological distress and 
subjective burden. In addition, Litz et al. (2009) stated that individuals who experience 
moral suffering may be more reluctant to utilize social supports, and it is possible that 
they may be actually shunned in light of the moral violation.  
When employees experience paranoid social cognition and simultaneously feel 
they have been wronged by someone inside the organization, they may not feel that there 
is anyone they can turn to for support. Employees who do not believe in the decisions and 
actions made by themselves (or others) in their organization as being morally ‘right’ may 
feel as though they are less able to express their concerns to friends and family in fear of 
worsening outsiders’ perceptions of their occupation. For example, a police officer who is 
hyperaware of the public’s perception of racial issues, may be less likely to confide in 
outsiders about perceived moral conflicts they experienced at work, in order to avoid 
confirming the stereotype. With no felt social support and questioning the beliefs of their 
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own work, the experience of moral suffering while working in a stigmatized occupation 
can deeply affect mental wellbeing. 
Previous research has identified the changes in emotions, relationships, and 
personal identity of morally injured participants as a result of perceived or actual 
rejection by family or friends leading to increased psychological and social problems 
(Ferrajão & Aragão Oliveira, 2016; Ferrajão & Oliveira, 2014; Purcell et al., 2016; 
Vargas et al., 2013; Worthen & Ahern, 2014). Researchers have found that military 
members felt resentment due to feeling misunderstood by civilians based on their job 
duties and this resentment led to increased moral suffering (Ferrajão & Aragão Oliveira, 
2016; Ferrajão & Oliveira, 2014; Nash & Litz, 2013). Participants reported the inability 
to express themselves and their experiences to outsiders who would not understand the 
requirements of war (Drescher et al., 2011; McCormack & Ell, 2017). One participant 
reported “civility is meaningless” in war and outsiders would not comprehend their 
cognitive and emotional states during the events that occurred (McCormack & Ell, 2017, 
p. 17). Other military participants believed they had to remain silent about their 
experiences to maintain healthy relationships in society (McCormack & Ell, 2017; 
Purcell et al., 2016). Similar results have been found within the healthcare field, where 
healthcare providers cited alienation from fellow providers and occupational networks 
after exposure to work-related morally injurious experiences (Gibbons et al., 2013; 
Haight et al., 2017).  
Litz et al. (2009) stated that the intensity of moral suffering may depend on 
outsiders’ reactions and opinions on those events which can explain differences in 
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experiences outcomes. The interaction of occupational stigma from one’s job duties and 
the perceived moral transgressions that occur at work can lead individuals to resort to 
self-destructive behaviors such as alcohol abuse, social isolation, and disconnecting from 
others (McCormack & Riley, 2016). These behaviors may be a consequence of 
individuals questioning the purpose of their work as a result of the moral transgression 
and allowing the stigma surrounding one’s work to harm their identity (Roca, 2010). 
Therefore, perceived occupational stigma may magnify the effects of moral suffering on 
the proposed outcomes. Thus, the following hypotheses are presented:  
H4-6: High levels of perceived occupational stigma at Time 1 will moderate the 
relationships between moral suffering at Time 1 and (4) mental health symptoms, 
(5) meaningful work, and (6) counterproductive work behaviors assessed at Time 
2; the relationship between moral suffering and the outcomes will be stronger for 






CHAPTER FIVE: METHOD 
Participants and Procedure 
In order to assess complex structural equation models (SEM), large sample sizes 
are needed to test the proposed relationships. Barret (2007) and Kline (2005) have 
suggested a sample of 200 as a minimum for complex structural models. Additionally, 
with the aim of establishing the presence of moral suffering within a variety of 
workplaces, participants were recruited through an online data collection service, 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Mturk; see Huff & Tingley, 2015). Mturk is an established 
survey software providing valid and reliable measurement methods (Buhrmester et al., 
2011; Pittman & Sheehan, 2016). Researchers have stated that Mturk is a representative 
sample of occupations in the US for occupational health research (Michel, 2018). 
Participants were eligible to participate in the study if they were a United States 
Citizen, 18 years old, and work at least 30 hours per week (at a job other than Mturk). A 
total of 699 participants responded to the Time 1 survey, and after the completion of the 
initial survey, participants were asked to participate in a follow up survey 3 months later. 
479 participants responded at Time 2 resulting in the final matched sample used in the 
analyses (69% response rate). Participants received compensation for completing the 
survey and passing all necessary attention checks.  
On average, participants were 41 years old (SD = 10.98), ranging from 20 years 
old to 71 years old. The gender of the participants was evenly split with 51% of 
participants identified themselves as male, 48% identified female, and .5% identified as 
nonbinary or transgender. The majority of participants were white (76%), followed by 
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Asian (9%), Black or African American (7%), Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin (6%), 
and Other (2%). Most participants had earned a Bachelors degree (43%), followed by 
18% of participants holding a Masters degree, 12% Associates Degree, 12% had some 
college, 7% had a high school degree, 5% had a Doctoral Degree, and 2% had some 
graduate school experience. 
On average, participants worked at their current job for 8 years (SD = 7.28); with 
63% of participants reported working 30-40 hours a week and 37% reported working 
more than 40 hours a week. Participants were asked “On average, how many people 
(management, coworkers, employees, customers) do you interact with on a daily basis at 
work?” Most participants worked with 1-10 individuals on a daily basis (40%), with 30% 
working with 11-20 other individuals, 9% worked with 21-30 people on a regular basis 
and 15% worked with more than 30 people. Only 6% of participants reported most often 
working alone. Participants reported working in a variety of industries, with the most 
common industries being Educational Services (16%), Professional, Scientific, and 
Technical Services (15%), Finance and Insurance (11%), Health Care and Social 
Assistance (11%). The majority of participants earned a yearly salary (58%) while 42% 
earned an hourly wage. Most participants earned $25,000-$49,000 (33%), followed by 
29% earning $50,000-$74,000, 19% earning $75,000-$99,000, 8% earning less than 
$25,000, and 10% earning over $100,000 in yearly salary.  
In order to test for response bias of differences between participants who 
responded to both time points in comparison to participants who only responded at Time 
1, independent samples t-tests and chi-square tests were computed. There were no 
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significant differences between the two groups in terms of gender, ꭓ2 (3) = 0.83, n.s., 
income, ꭓ2 (5) = 10.48, n.s., salary/hourly employment, ꭓ2 (1) = .033, n.s., and education, ꭓ2 
(7) = 10.39, n.s. However, there were significant differences between the groups in ethnicity, 
ꭓ2 (5) = 18.52, p < .01, the frequency of white participants whom responded to both Time 
periods increased from 67% at Time 1 to 76% at Time 2, while participants who identified as 
Black or African American decreased from Time 1 (16%) to Time 2 (7%). Participants who 
responded to both Time periods were also older (M = 40.6, SD = 11.00) compared to those 
who only responded to Time 1 (M = 38.0, SD = 10.50), t (700) = 94.85, p < .01. 
Additionally, participants who responded to both time periods worked at their current 
position longer (M = 7.71, SD = 7.28) compared to those who only responded to Time 1 (M 
= 6.17, SD = 5.75), t (704) = 25.10, p < .01. 
 Additional analyses were conducted on the key measures utilized in the study. There 
were no significant differences between the groups in terms of meaningful work, t (472) = 
1.63, n.s. However, there were significant differences between the two groups in the 
frequency (t (319) = 4.09, p < .01) and the experience (t (396) = 2.38, p < .05) of moral 
suffering, where participants who responded to only the first survey had higher frequency of 
exposure (M = 2.24, SD = 1.51) and experienced more moral suffering (M = 2.60, SD = 1.72) 
than participants who responded to both time periods (M = 1.78, SD = 1.05; M = 2.28, SD = 
1.59, respectively). Additionally, participants who responded to both time points experienced 
less perceived occupational stigma (M = 2.41, SD = 1.64) than those who responded to Time 
1 (M = 2.92, SD = 1.92), t (373) = 3.46, p < .05.. Participants who responded to both time 
periods also had slightly less mental health symptoms, t (382) = 3.38, p < .05 (M = 1.66, SD 
= 0.83) and committed less counterproductive work behaviors, t (266) = 5.61, p < .05, (M = 
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1.25, SD = 0.69) than those who responded only to the first survey (M = 1.91, SD = 0.95; M 
= 1.83, SD = 1.44, respectively). Overall, while the differences were statistically significant, 
the mean differences and effect sizes were relatively small, suggesting that the differences 
will not contribute to problematic patterns of attrition.  
Measures 
All study measures were collected at both time periods. The complete list of 
measures, instructions, and their respective items can be found in Appendices A-F. The 
Time 1 survey included demographic variables such as age, race, gender, industry, 
professional title, and tenure. Moral suffering was assessed through four scales targeting 
moral suffering frequency (frequency of morally injurious experiences and morally 
distressing events) and moral suffering intensity (perceived moral injury and moral 
distress; Glasberg et al., 2006; Hamric & Blackhall, 2007; Lev & Ayalon, 2018).  
Morally Injurious Experiences. The frequency of exposure to morally injurious 
experiences was assessed using a modified version of the Morally Injurious Experiences 
Scale (Currier, Holland, Rojas-Flores, et al., 2015). The original scale was intended for a 
sample of teachers in El-Salvador with references to educational leaders, students, and 
teaching personnel, thus the scale was adapted to refer to management, coworkers, and 
people at work. Additionally, the original 12 item scale was contaminated with 4 items 
referring to feelings associated with an event and thus all emotional components were 
removed from the scale to ensure only the frequency of morally injurious events was 
captured in this section. The items were “things I saw/experienced things that left me 
feeling betrayed or let-down by educational leaders” (item 1), “I feel guilt over failing to 
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protect a student” (item 3), “I feel guilt for being able to return to safety at the end of the 
work day when many students cannot” (item 5) and “I felt betrayed or let-down by my 
colleagues” (item 7). The four items were modified to remove the emotional component 
and rephrased to focus on the event, such as “I saw a coworker engage in actions that I 
did not agree with” (modified item 7). Two items referred to the emotional outcomes of 
moral injury and thus were removed from the questionnaire as they did not specifically 
reference a situation that has the potential to cause moral injury (“Seeing people suffer in 
the workplace has changed me” (item 9) and “I came to realize that I am no longer 
affected by violence I have seen at work” (item 11)). See Appendix A for the original and 
modified versions of the scale. 
Participants were instructed to select the choice that indicates how often they have 
experienced each of the situations over the past 3 months. The instructions also clarified 
referents as being ‘anyone you are in contact with at work’ as moral injurious events can 
involve oneself, coworkers, management, or clients/patients/customers. Participants 
responded to 10 items, 5 referring to witness-based events (e.g., “I have seen someone 
unnecessarily harmed at work”) and 5 items referring to perpetration-based events (e.g., 
“I failed to take action in helping someone at work”). The items were assessed with a 6-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never, have no experience) to 6 (always, everyday). 
Internal consistency was not calculated in the initial study, as the authors stated that the 
measure contained reflective items (Currier, Holland, Rojas-Flores, et al., 2015). 
However, the authors provided evidence that the measure contained face validity and 
construct validity through its correlation with related constructs such PTSD and Burnout. 
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Morally Distressing Events. The frequency of exposure to morally distressing 
events was assessed with adapted versions of two Moral Distress Questionnaires 
(Eizenberg et al., 2009; Lev & Ayalon, 2018). Similar to the morally injurious 
experiences measure, this scale was intended to assess only the frequency of events. Two 
scales were combined in order to ensure that both perpetration-based and witness-based 
morally distressing events were included. The Eizenberg et al. (2009) measure contained 
only perpetration-based items and thus witness-based morally distressing events from the 
Lev and Ayalon (2018) measure were added. Additionally, the two scales were modified 
for the present study for a few reasons. First, the original measures were tailed to 
healthcare or social work practices, so the referents were adjusted to apply more broadly 
modifying original items from residents, patients, physicians, and institution to 
management, coworkers, and people at work. Secondly, Eizenberg et al.’s (2009) original 
measure was cross contaminated with other related constructs, such as role conflict, role 
overload, and role ambiguity (e.g., item 6, “I was forced to provide an incomplete 
treatment to the patient owing to work overload”) as a result, 5 items were removed from 
the adapted measure. Additionally, one item was specific to the healthcare industry and 
would not be generalizable to a wide variety of occupations (item 12, “I was forced to 
ignore the clients/customer/ patient’s family questions because my supervisor the 
physician was supposed to address them”) and thus was cut from the adapted measure. 




In addition to the items from Eizenberg et al. (2009), 5 items were taken from the 
Lev and Ayalon (2018) measure to supplement the missing ‘witness’ component from the 
previous measure. However, 4 out of the 5 items contained emotional referents (e.g., item 
6, “There were situations in which I felt that the interest of the institution’s management 
was in contradiction with the interest of the residents”), thus, feelings were adapted to 
reflect on the actual situation that occurred (e.g., “There have been situations where I 
believed management's interests were in contradiction with the purpose of my work”). 
See Appendix A for the original scale and modified measure.  
Participants were instructed to select the choice that indicates how often they have 
experienced each of the situations over the past 3 months. The instructions also clarified 
referents as being ‘anyone you are in contact with at work’ as moral injurious events can 
involve oneself, coworkers, management, or clients/patients/customers. Participants 
responded to 10 items, with 4 items referring to the witness-based events such as, “I have 
been forced to do my job according to my organization’s protocols, which were against 
my professional opinion” and 6 items referred to the perpetration-based events such as, “I 
have seen a college behavior in an inappropriate way at work that I did not have the 
ability to prevent.” All items were rated on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never, 
have no experience) to 6 (always, everyday). Eizenberg et al.’s (2009) original measure 
demonstrated test-retest reliability and had an internal consistency of .81 for the full 
measure in the initial study. Both scales established content validity through qualitative 
data (focus groups and interviews) and expert review and evaluation of the measures. 
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Moral Suffering Intensity. As previous authors have suggested, moral suffering 
is an appraisal-based construct in which many situations have the potential to cause the 
psychological and emotional response to occur, but it is an individual’s appraisal of the 
event as being against their belief of what is right that causes moral suffering. In order to 
assess the degree to which a reaction occurred, each morally injurious and morally 
distressing event was followed by “to what extent did this situation upset you?”  The item 
was based off the troubled conscience item from the Stress of Conscience Questionnaire 
(Glasberg et al., 2006). The original scale utilized a similar format to the current study, as 
each question involved a two-part response where participants reported (A) how often a 
stressful event occurred and then responded to (B) “to what extent did this situation give 
you a troubled conscience?” Responses ranged from 1 (not at all) to 6 (extremely). The 
original measure was pilot tested on two samples (faculty and healthcare workers), had 
high test-retest reliability and internal consistency when included in the overall scale and 
thus provided rationale for indexing the intensity from the single item. 
Mental Health Symptoms. Participants indicated their current mental health 
symptoms by responding to a combined measure of the Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
Scale (GAD-7; Spitzer et al., 2006) and the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ; Spitzer 
et al., 1999). Participants were instructed to reflect on the past 3 months and report how 
often they were bothered by 7 items referring to anxiety symptoms such as, “not being 
able to stop or control worrying” and 9 items referring to depressive symptoms such as, 
“feeling down, depressed, or hopeless.” Participants responded to the items using a 4-
point response scale ranging from (1) not at all to (4) nearly every day. Prior authors have 
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demonstrated the reliability and validity of the measures though test-retest reliability and 
reporting an internal consistency of .92 for GAD-7 and .86 for the PHQ in the original 
studies (Spitzer et al., 1999; 2006). The original authors established criterion validity 
through strong agreement with mental health professional diagnoses and construct 
validity by measuring the association of both measures to self-reported disability days, 
clinic visits, and the general amount of difficulty patients attribute to their symptoms 
(Spitzer et al., 1999; 2006). Additionally, the GAD-7 had convergent validity with two 
other anxiety scales: The Beck Anxiety Inventory and the anxiety subscale of the 
Symptom Checklist-90 (Spitzer et al., 2006).  
Meaningful Work. To assess meaningful work, the Work and Meaning Inventory 
(Steger et al., 2012) was used. The original scale was derived from the multidimensional 
model of work as a subjectively meaningful experience consisting of experiencing 
positive meaning in work, sensing that work is a key avenue for making meaning, and 
perceiving one’s work to benefit some greater good (Steger et al., 2012). Participants 
were instructed to respond to 10 items, referring to positive meaning (“I understand how 
my work contributes to my life’s meaning”), meaning making (“I view my work as 
contributing to my personal growth”) and greater good motivations (“My work helps me 
make sense of the world around me”). Participants responded to the items on a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (absolutely untrue) to 5 (absolutely true). The authors 
reported high reliability for the scale in the original study, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .93 
(Steger et al., 2012). The authors established convergent validity through high 
correlations with other meaningful work measures such as the Brief Calling Scale (Dik et 
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al., 2012) and Work Orientation scale (Wrzesniewski, 1999). The scale was also shown 
to have high criterion validity as it was positively related to desirable work variables 
(e.g., organizational citizenship behaviors, organizational commitment, job satisfaction) 
and negatively related to undesirable work variables (e.g., days reported absent, 
withdrawal intentions). 
Perceived Occupational Stigma. In order to assess how individuals perceive 
outsiders’ perception of their work, participants responded to the Occupational Stigma 
Perception Questionnaire (Schaubroeck et al., 2018). Participants were instructed to 
consider the extent that the items applied to their job in general. Participants responded to 
5 items such as, “Most people would not want to associate themselves with a job like 
mine” on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) Likert scale. The original study 
cited a Cronbach’s alpha of .84 establishing good reliability of the scale (Schaubroeck et 
al., 2018). The authors offered evidence of convergent validity of the scale in relation to 
constructs such as occupational disidentification, withdrawal behavior and occupational 
prestige. 
Counterproductive Work Behaviors. Participants reported the frequency that they 
engaged in counterproductive work behaviors with the Workplace Deviance Scale 
(Bennett & Robinson, 2000). The scale reflects both interpersonal deviance and 
organizationally directed deviance. Participants were instructed to reflect on the previous 
3 months and report the frequency they engaged 19 items such as “Taken property from 
work without permission” (organizational deviance) and “played a mean prank on 
someone at work” (interpersonal deviance). Participants responded to the items using a 6-
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point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never, have no experience) to 6 (always, everyday). 
Internal consistency was .81 for the organizationally deviance scale and .78 for the 
interpersonal deviance scale in the original study (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). The 
authors established convergent validity with production and property deviance (Hollinger 
& Clark, 1982) and withdrawal behaviors (Lehman & Simpson, 1992). The authors also 
provided evidence of discriminant validity with measures such as voice and loyalty 
(Farrell & Rusbult, 1986). 
Attention Check. In order to ensure participants were paying attention and 
providing high quality data, there was one attention check item included in each survey. 
The item was embedded within a scale chosen at random, such as “please select agree for 
this item.” If a participant answered the item incorrectly, the participant was warned and 
then had to start the survey from the beginning. A second failure of the attention check 
item excluded them from participation, and they did not receive pay for their survey 
responses. This attention check system was outlined in the initial page of the survey 
within the informed consent page so that participants were aware. 
Analytical Plan 
The proposed analyses were conducted in R Studio using the lavaan (Rosseel, 
2012), dplyr (Wickham, 2020), and semPlot (Epskamp, 2015) packages. Descriptive 
analyses were first conducted assessing the quality of item characteristics. The means, 
standard deviations and Cronbach’s alpha for each measurement scale have been reported 
in Table 6.  
66 
 
As multiple measures were adapted and modified, the appropriate validation 
strategies were conducted to establish the measurement model components before testing 
the direct hypotheses. First, in order to assess the measurement structure of moral 
suffering, an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was conducted on one half of the 
sample, using the moral injury and moral distress items as indicators for the latent 
constructs. The frequency items were not included into the initial factor analyses as they 
are formative measures, and thus an observed score is used in the hypothesized models. 
Following the suggested model factors from the EFA, the items were included in a 
Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA) using robust maximum likelihood estimation (ML) 
and the second half of the sample. The CFA was conducted with an emphasis on the 
distinction between (1) moral injury and moral distress and (2) perpetration-based verses 
witness-based moral suffering. Previous work has assessed the differences in these 
distinctions and the current study will provide additional support for the validity for each 
distinction. If the model fit was improved (χ2 p > .05, RMSEA < .08, CFI ≥ .90, and 
SRMR < .08) when accounting for a given distinction, then the subscales were treated as 
different measures through the remainder of the study (Kline, 2005).  
In order to provide a comprehensive measure of moral suffering, a product score 
that accounted for both the frequency and the intensity of each moral suffering 
experience was also calculated. The measurement model of the product scores will also 
be assessed. Given the need for clarification of the measurement model of moral 
suffering, the measurement components of the analyses, item loading characteristics, and 
fit indices of each measurement model were reported. Following the assessment of the 
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moral suffering model indices, a second CFA was conducted on all study variables to 
demonstrate the uniqueness of each scale. Model fit indices were also specified. 
In order to assess the relationship between constructs, the regression estimates 
between moral suffering distinctions and mental health symptoms (H1), meaningful work 
(H2), and counterproductive work behaviors (H3) were analyzed with a structural 
equation model (SEM; see Figure 2). SEM allows multiple measurement models to be 
compared with the paths among the variables estimated and adjusted as necessary. 
Similar to the CFA analyses, all items were indicators of the latent variables (except the 
frequency scores). For each hypothesis, a model that regressed the moral suffering 
components on the outcomes was compared to a second model that constrained the path 
between each component on the outcomes. Constraining the parameters to be equal 
forced the model to make both moral suffering dimensions have equal loadings on the 
outcomes and determined whether the variables contributed equally to the outcomes. 
Thus, the study’s proposition that moral injury and moral distress are unique constructs 
will be supported if the model that allows the paths to be freely estimated has improved 
model fit. Further, the semipartial correlation (sr2) of each relationship was be assessed. 
The sr2 removes the effect of one IV relative to another without removing the relationship 
to Y, therefore demonstrating the unique contribution of moral distress and moral injury 
on the dependent variables.  
Next, perceived occupational stigma was examined as a moderator between the 
relationships of moral suffering and outcomes (H4-6). Age and tenure were used as 
control variables. Past research has suggested that novice workers (due to age and 
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experience) in a profession that is typically associated with a stigma increases the 
likelihood of negative outcomes due to new employees lacking the experience of coping 
with the stereotypes associated with work (Ghidina, 1992). Thus, the proposed analyses 
were assessed first without the control variables and compared to a second model with 
the control variables. 
To examine perceived occupational stigma as a moderator of the proposed 
relationships, the interaction terms were calculated by the double-mean centering 
approach (Lin et al., 2010). Researchers have stated that the double-mean centering 
approach is superior to estimating latent interaction effects over other methods, especially 
when normality assumptions have been violated (Lin et al., 2010).  For each latent 
predictor variable, the indicators were ranked in terms of their relative factor loading, and 
then were mean centered. Next, the indicator item with the highest factor loading for the 
moral suffering latent variable was multiplied by the indicator item with the highest 
factor loading for the perceived occupational stigma latent variable. Each indicator item 
of the moral suffering dimension was multiplied by the corresponding indictor item of the 
perceived occupational stigma variable, resulting in 5 product terms. The product items 
were mean centered again. The SEM interaction model contained the main effects, 
control variables and interaction terms (see Figures 3-5). The model fit indices for the 
causal model were examined and reported (χ2 p > .05, RMSEA < .08, CFI ≥ .90, and 
SRMR < .08). If the specific interactions between moral suffering and perceived stigma 
were significant, tests of simple slopes between moral suffering and the outcomes were 
conducted at low (-1 SD), medium (M), and high levels of stigma (+1 SD).  
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CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS 
Prevalence of Moral Suffering 
In order to understand how often participants were exposed to events that had the 
potential to cause moral suffering, a preliminary analysis examined the rate of 
endorsement for each item (N = 699). The items were recoded as (0) never experienced or 
(1) experienced at least once over the course of the three months (see Table 1). The top 
three most frequently experienced events were “I saw a coworker engage in actions that I 
did not agree with (MI7; 74%)”, “I have seen coworkers behave in contradiction with the 
best interests of our clients/patients/customers (MD7; 61%)”, and “I have seen a 
colleague behave in an inappropriate way at work that I did not have the ability to prevent 
(MD9; 55%). Interestingly, the top three situations that caused the most moral suffering 
was also MI7 (71%), MD7 (60%), and MD9(53%). No items were reported as ‘never 
experienced’ by all participants. Overall, about half of the participants had experienced 
each moral suffering item at least once over the past three months.  
Moral suffering was also examined at the industry level. Due to small sample 
sizes (N < 10), wholesale trade, real estate, agriculture, utilities, mining/oil, and gas 
extraction, self-employed, and those who reported other services were excluded from this 
preliminary analysis. All industries reported experiencing moral suffering to some 
degree. Thirteen out of the eighteen industries reported experiencing moral suffering 
regularly at work; where 7.4% of administrative and support services, 5.6% of finance 
and insurance, 5.4% of manufacturing, 5.3% of government, 4% of accommodation and 
food services, 4% of education services, 2% of healthcare and 1.4% of 
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professional/scientific participants reported experiencing moral suffering “every week” or 
“everyday”. The industries that had over half of their participants endorse experiencing 
moral suffering (more often than not) were construction (75%), other (73%), 
administration and support services (56%), finance and insurance (52%) and education 
services (50%). 
Moral Suffering Measurement Model  
Descriptive analyses indicated that the multivariate normality assumptions (e.g., 
skewness, kurtosis) were violated by all study variables, meaning that overall, 
participants tended to respond on the extreme ends of the response scale. For example, 
many individuals reported that they had never or rarely experienced the moral suffering 
items, or rarely engaged in counterproductive work behaviors. This finding is not 
surprising, as the variables assessed in this study are not expected to occur for every 
individual to a high degree. While multivariate nonnormality can influence the outcomes 
of statistical analyses, researchers have provided strategies to incorporate in SEM 
analyses to overcome influences of skewness.  
Fabrigar (1998) recommended using principal axis factor methods when 
conducting EFA and CFA when multivariate normality is ‘severely violated’. When data 
are more frequently occurring along one part of the measurement scale, the skew can 
affect the variance-covariance among variables. As a result, researchers suggest using 
maximum likelihood parameter estimates with standard errors and a mean-adjusted chi-
square test statistic that are robust to non-normality (“MLM”; Hu, Bentler, & Kano, 
1992; Curran, West, & Finch, 1996). The chi-square test statistic is also referred to as the 
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Satorra-Bentler chi-square (Satorra & Bentler 1988; 1994). Adjustments are made to the 
chi-square, relative fit indices, and standard errors based on a weight matrix derived from 
an estimate of multivariate kurtosis.  
In order assess the measurement model of moral suffering, the dataset was split 
into two random halves (N=349), using one half to develop the model (EFA) and the 
other half to validate the solution (CFA; Anderson & Gerbing, 1988, p. 421). First, all 
moral suffering intensity indicator items were entered in the EFA model. The parallel 
analysis suggested that the items loaded on an estimated 3 factors. In order to be 
thorough, the EFA was conducted three times, extracting 2, 3, and 4 factors from the 
model in order to compare which best fit the data. Upon inspection of the 2-factor 
loadings, the factors seemed to represent witness-based moral suffering and perpetration-
based moral suffering, with no items cross-loading onto both factors.  
The 3-factor model replicated the 2-factor witness – perpetration distinction, with 
the items that loaded on a third factor representing safety-related items such as 
experiences involving witnessing harm induced by a coworker or the inability to act and 
protect someone. However, the safety variable included both witness- and perpetration-
based items. The 3-factor model included 5 items with cross-loadings on two factors. The 
4-factor model reproduced the same findings from the 3-factor model except two items 
loaded on their own final fourth factor and included a total of 4-items cross loading on 
two factors. Comparing the models in terms of theoretically sound factors, minimal cross 
loadings, and parsimony, the 2-factor model was deemed most appropriate. The 2-factor 
model contained two items (MI2 and MI4) that loaded onto the ‘incorrect’ factor, as both 
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items were worded as witnessing an event (“I have seen…”) but loaded onto the 
perpetration-based factor, conflicting with the remainder of the other items in the factor 
(see Table 2 for factor loadings). Therefore, these two items were removed from the next 
step of the validation model. 
Following the suggested model factor structure from the EFA, the moral suffering 
items were included in a series of Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA) using the second 
half of the split dataset (N =349). The initial CFA assessing the 2-factor structure 
revealed adequate fit with the data (χ2 (134) = 373.428, p < .05, RMSEA = .088, TLI = 
.894, CFI = .907, and SRMR = .055). However, after examining the factor loadings, it 
appeared that two items had low loadings compared to the other items in the scale. The 
items were “I have been able to leave my work psychologically or physically safe when I 
know others at work cannot (MI5; ꞵ = .53)” and “I failed to take action in helping 
someone at work (MI6; ꞵ = .55). After removing these two items, the model fit indices 
improved, (χ2 (103) = 279.174, p < .05, RMSEA = .086, TLI = .913, CFI = .926, and 
SRMR = .051).  
Next, a Lagrange-Multiplier test (LM test) was conducted to suggest potential 
modifications to the measurement structure. The test provided a logical suggestion to add 
a residual covariance between MI9 (“I have seen people at work suffer because of actions 
involving other employees at my organization”) and MI10 (“I saw mistakes made by my 
coworkers or other employees that led to other people suffering at work”). Both items 
referred to seeing people at work suffer due to other employees, and thus adding this 
modification was deemed a logical improvement to the model. The residual covariance 
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was added to the model and improved the overall model χ2 by 37.21, (χ2 (102) = 256.38, 
p < .05, RMSEA = .081, TLI = .924, CFI = .935, and SRMR = .049). The LM test 
suggested adding another residual covariance between MI7 (“I saw a coworker engage in 
actions that I did not agree with”) and MD9 (“I have seen a colleague behave in an 
inappropriate way…”). Both items refer to disagreeing with coworker actions and was 
deemed appropriate. After adding the covariance between the two items, the model fit 
improved by ꭓ2 = 29.80, (χ2 (101) = 236.134, p < .05, RMSEA = .076, TLI = .933, CFI = 
.943, and SRMR = .048).  
Following this modification, the LM test did not provide compelling rationale to 
add any other covariances. Within the final moral suffering model, the item loadings 
ranged from .62 to .86 (see Table 3). One of the primary research questions in the current 
study was to assess whether moral injury and moral distress are separate distinct 
constructs under the same second-order factor of moral suffering. The measurement 
model suggested that moral injury and moral distress do not appear to be distinct 
constructs in the present study. Instead, another two-factor structure was found, 
witnessing an event that causes moral suffering or perpetrating the event oneself. The 
remainder of the hypotheses assessed the proposed relationships using this updated 2-
factor model.  
Moral Suffering as a Product Score 
In addition to examining the frequency and intensity of moral suffering, a product 
score of the two variables was created in order to provide a comprehensive measure of 
the moral suffering experience. Following the work of Corley (1995), the moral suffering 
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frequency items were multiplied by their corresponding intensity (B) item and again 
assessed for their model fit. The same 2-factor structure was used as stated previously, 
resulting in adequate model fit, (χ2 (103) = 230.883, p < .05, RMSEA = .092, TLI = .925, 
CFI = .935, and SRMR = .044). Similar to the main model, the LM test suggested adding 
a residual covariance between MI9 and MI10 improving the model fit by χ2 = 61.53 (χ2 
(102) = 208.332, p < .05, RMSEA = .084, TLI = .938, CFI = .947, and SRMR = .043).  
The LM test suggested one more logical addition to the model. Modification 
indices suggested adding a covariance between MI3 (“I have failed to protect someone at 
work from unnecessary harm”) and MI8 (“I have not had access to the resources or 
materials I needed to do my job in a way that protected other people at work”) where 
both items refer to protecting others at work. After the modification was added, the model 
fit was improved, (χ2 (101) = 195.218, p < .05, RMSEA = .079, TLI = .945, CFI = .954, 
and SRMR = .041). Following the prior modifications, there were no other logical 
suggestions provided by the LM test. Within the final model, items loadings ranged from 
.68 to .90 (see Table 4). Given the good fit to the data, the product terms were used to 
represent moral suffering when testing the remaining hypotheses, as opposed to the less 
parsimonious approach of using separate frequency and intensity assessments. 
Other Construct Measurement Models 
In order to ensure that all other study variables were assessing their unique 
constructs, a second set of CFAs’ was conducted on the established study measures. In 
comparison to the first set of factor analyses, the CFA for the remainder of the study 
variables only included the matched sample (N = 479) for validation, as the Time 2 
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outcomes were used in the structural models. The fit statistics for all measurement 
models can be found in Table 5. 
Perceived Occupational Stigma 
The CFA for the perceived occupational stigma measure showed adequate fit to 
the data except for the RMSEA statistic, (χ2 (5) = 44.80, p < .05, RMSEA = .189, TLI = 
.883, CFI = .942, and SRMR = .055). Item loadings ranged from .64 to .93. There were 
no compelling adjustments made by the LM test that would theoretically make sense. 
Therefore, no adjustments were made to the perceived occupational stigma measure.  
Mental Health symptoms  
The initial CFA that established the measurement model for mental health 
symptoms did not fit well to the data, (χ2 (104) = 616.11, p < .05, RMSEA = .139, TLI = 
.817, CFI = .841, and SRMR = .068). The mental health symptom measure was 
developed by combining the depression and anxiety indicators into one construct, thus 
there was conceptual rationale for splitting the two constructs into two latent constructs. 
As a result, the model fit was improved, (χ2 (103) = 415.62, p < .05, RMSEA = .105, TLI 
= .894, CFI = .909, and SRMR = .060). One item, DEP8 (“Moving or speaking so slowly 
that other people have noticed? Or the opposite - being so fidgety or restless that you 
have been moving around a lot more than usual”) had a low factor loading compared to 
the other items (ꞵ = .54), and thus was dropped from the model. Once DEP8 was 
removed, the model fit was significantly improved, (χ2 (89) = 299.96, p < .05, RMSEA = 
.092, TLI = .925, CFI = .937, and SRMR = .049).  
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However, the LM test suggested further improvements. The most logical 
modification with the highest predicted improvement suggested adding a residual 
covariance between DEP3 (“Trouble falling or staying asleep or sleeping too much”) and 
DEP4 (“Feeling tried or having little energy”), as both items refer to feeling extremely 
tired. After the residual covariance was added between the two items, model fit improved 
by χ2 = 77.49 and was deemed satisfactory, (χ2 (88) = 253.32, p < .05, RMSEA = .082, 
TLI = .941, CFI = .950, and SRMR = .048). Item loadings ranged from .61 to .90. There 
were no other compelling suggestions made by the LM test that would theoretically make 
sense. Therefore, no more adjustments were made to the mental health symptoms 
measure.  
Meaningful Work 
The initial meaningful work measurement CFA showed adequate fit to the data, 
except for the RMSEA statistic (χ2 (35) = 339.029, p < .05, RMSEA = .168, TLI = .883, 
CFI = .909, and SRMR = .042). However, the meaningful work assessment included 
three subdimensions (positive meaning, meaning making through work, and greater good 
motivations), so in order to improve model fit, the three subdimensions were accounted 
for. The second CFA, including the three subdimension for meaningful work, 
demonstrated much better fit to the data, χ2 (32) = 117.33, p < .05, RMSEA = .089, TLI = 
.967, CFI = .977, and SRMR = .022). Upon examining the item loadings, MW8 had a 
lower factor loading than the other items (“My work really makes no difference to the 
world (r)”; ꞵ = .49), therefore, this item was dropped from the model. After the item was 
dropped, model fit improved by χ2 =19.62 resulting in satisfactory model fit, except for 
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the RMSEA statistic, χ2 (24) = 97.71, p < .05, RMSEA = .101, TLI = .965, CFI = .977, 
and SRMR = .022). There were no other compelling suggestions made by the LM test 
that would theoretically make sense. Therefore, no other adjustments were made to the 
meaningful work measure. 
All Study Variables CFA 
The final CFA, which included the 5 latent variables (witness- and perpetration-
based moral suffering product scores, perceived occupational stigma, meaningful work, 
and mental health symptoms) with their adjusted measurement models as described 
above, demonstrated adequate model fit (χ2 (914) = 1714.426, p < .05, RMSEA = .049, 
TLI = .933, CFI = .938, and SRMR = .050). Modification indices did not suggest any 
rational changes and thus no further modifications were made.  
Correlations with Outcomes 
 In order to assess the strength of relationships among study variables, bivariate 
correlation analyses were conducted among the study variables. The correlations used a 
mean composite score based on the measurement model at each time point. The 
correlation table, along with Cronbach’s alphas on the diagonal, can be seen in Table 6.  
Past research has suggested that novice workers (due to age and experience) in a 
profession that is typically associated with a stigma increases the likelihood of negative 
outcomes due to new employees lacking the experience of coping with the stereotypes 
associated with work (Ghidina, 1992). Thus, age and tenure were added to the correlation 
table to assess whether the proposed analyses would require including control variables. 
Age was correlated with perpetration-based moral suffering, such that the older the 
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participant the less likely they endorsed experiencing perpetration-based moral suffering 
(r = -.11, p < .05). Age was also related to Time 2 mental health symptoms, such that the 
older the participant, the less likely they experienced depression or anxiety symptoms (r 
= -.10, p < .05). Tenure was correlated with meaningful work at both time points, such 
that the longer a participant had worked at their current job the more meaningful work 
they experienced (r’s = .16 - .18, p’s < .01). As a result of these findings, age and tenure 
were used as control variables in the remainder of the study hypotheses.  
As expected, witness- and perpetration-based moral suffering were positively 
related. However, this relationship was only moderate (r = .34, p < .01). In general, 
participants reported having low perceived occupational stigma, high meaningful work, 
rarely engaged in counterproductive work behaviors, and had low mental health 
symptoms. Additionally, witness- and perpetration-based moral suffering had moderate 
positive relationships with perceived occupational stigma (r’s = .40, .27, p’s < .01, 
respectively), mental health symptoms (r’s = .34, .22, p’s < .01, respectively) and 
counterproductive work behaviors (r’s = .21, .41, p’s < .01, respectively). Interestingly, 
there was a moderate negative relationship between witnessed-based moral suffering and 
meaningful work (r = -.28, p < .01), while there was no significant relationship between 
perpetration-based moral suffering and meaningful work. In general, all study variables 
showed high test-retest correlations across the two time points in the study (r’s = .60 to 
.80, p < .01). 
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Structural Models of Moral Suffering Predicting Outcomes (H1 – 3) 
The hypotheses examining whether moral suffering at Time 1 predicted mental 
health symptoms (H1), meaningful work (H2), and counterproductive work behaviors 
(H3) at Time 2 were analyzed with a series of structural equation models (SEM). SEM 
allows multiple measurement models to be compared with the paths among the variables 
estimated and adjusted as necessary. Similar to the CFA analyses, all items served as 
indicators of the latent variables (except the frequency of engaging in CWBs which were 
treated as an observed score). However, finding significant effects in complex SEM can 
be difficult to obtain (Deng, Yang, & Marcoulides, 2018), and given the proposed 
hypotheses required testing many different paths among the 4 latent variables (witness, 
perpetration, frequency and intensity of moral suffering) and 3 latent outcomes, along 
with the control variables, model convergence was unlikely if all outcome measures were 
estimated at once. Therefore, each outcome variable was included in its own SEM, and 
the moral suffering product terms were used as the latent predictors. The standardized 
regression estimates (ꞵ) for each model can be found in Table 7. The initial model was 
compared to a second model with the control variables of age, tenure, and Time 1 
outcomes.  
In order to provide additional insight into the unique contributions of the moral 
suffering dimensions, two additional analyses were conducted. First, the models were 
replicated with equality constraints between the moral suffering paths and the proposed 
outcome. Constraining the parameters to be equal forced the models to make both moral 
suffering latent variables to have equal loadings on the outcomes. The effects of the 
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constrained model were compared by a Wald test using standardized regression 
coefficients using the lavaan package (Klopp, 2020). Secondly, the semipartial 
correlations were calculated for each model. The semipartial correlations were calculated 
using the ppcor package (Kim, 2015). The semipartial correlation (sr2) removes the effect 
of one predictor variable relative to another without removing the initial variables 
relationship to the dependent variable (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2013). Thus, the 
semipartial correlations represent the ‘unique’ contribution of the moral suffering 
dimension (e.g., witness-based moral suffering) in relation to the outcome, above and 
beyond the other dimension (e.g., perpetration-based moral suffering). 
Mental Health Symptoms  
Hypothesis 1, which stated that the moral suffering dimensions assessed at Time 1 
would uniquely predict increased mental health symptoms at Time 2, was partially 
supported. Witness- and perpetration-based moral suffering product terms were entered 
in an SEM predicting mental health symptoms. The full model demonstrated good fit 
with the data (χ2 (427) = 944.199, p < .05, RMSEA = .065, TLI = .910, CFI = .917, and 
SRMR = .053). The predictors explained 18% of the variance in mental health symptoms 
(f 2=.22). Although both predictors displayed significant positive bivariate correlations 
with mental health symptoms, only witness-based moral suffering was a significant 
predictor of Time 2 mental health symptoms in the structural model (ꞵ= .38 p < .01). The 
results remained significant even after controlling for age and tenure, however, the 




The model was refit to the data using equality constraints. The paths between 
witness-based moral suffering and perpetration-based moral suffering were constrained to 
be equal in predicting mental health symptoms. The constrained model decreased 
witness-based moral suffering from ꞵ = .38 in the unconstrainted model to ꞵ = .22 in the 
constrained model. However, the Wald test suggested that there was not a significant 
difference among the standardized regression coefficients (W = 1.83, n.s.). Thus, 
according to the Wald test, the relative effects of the constrained and unconstrained paths 
between the moral suffering predictors on mental health symptoms were not statistically 
different from one another. In contrast, the semipartial correlations indicated that witness-
based moral suffering at Time 1 uniquely accounted for 8% of the variance in mental 
health symptoms at Time 2 (p < .01), while perpetration-based moral suffering uniquely 
accounted for 1% of the variance in mental health symptoms at Time 2 (p < .05). In 
summary, the results provided two pieces of evidence to support Hypothesis 1a. 
Meaningful Work 
Hypothesis 2, which stated that the moral suffering dimensions assessed at Time 1 
would uniquely predict decreased meaningful work at Time 2, was also partially 
supported. The Time 1 moral suffering product terms were entered into the model 
predicting meaningful work at Time 2. The model fit the data adequately (χ2 (267) = 
563.316, p < .05, RMSEA = .063, TLI = .942, CFI = .948, and SRMR = .047) and 
explained 6% of the variance in meaningful work (f 2=.07). Similar to the bivariate 
correlation estimates, the SEM regression estimates indicated that witness-based moral 
suffering was the only predictor of meaningful work (ꞵ = -.36, p < .01). Witness-based 
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moral suffering had a moderate negative relationship with meaningful work at Time 2, 
such that increased witness-based moral suffering experiences predicted lower 
meaningful work over time. The relationship was still significant after controlling for age 
and tenure, and marginally significant after controlling for Time 1 meaningful work (p = 
.059). Interestingly, when Time 1 meaningful work was added to the model, perpetration-
based moral suffering appeared as a significant predictor (ꞵ = .51, p < .01). Due to the 
initial non-significant finding and consequent reciprocal sign change, this finding is likely 
due to suppression. Statistical suppression occurs when at least one predictor has a 
standardized regression estimate (ꞵ) or semi-partial correlation (sr) that is larger in 
magnitude or has a reverse sign than its respective raw correlation with the outcome 
(Lubin, 1957; Velicer, 1978). Perpetration-based moral suffering had a standardized 
regression of ꞵ = .21 and sr = -.27, whereas its raw correlation with meaningful work was 
r = - .05, satisfying both conditions of suppression.  
The model was refit to the data using equality constraints. The paths between 
witness-based moral suffering and perpetration-based moral suffering were constrained to 
be equal in predicting meaningful work. The results of the Wald test suggested that there 
was a significant difference among the standardized regression coefficients (W = 4.04, p 
< .05). According to the Wald test, the relative effects of the moral suffering predictors 
on meaningful work were not equivalent. The constrained model decreased witness-based 
moral suffering from ꞵ = -.36 in the unconstrainted model to ꞵ = -.11 in the constrained 
model. Further, the semipartial correlations indicated that witness-based moral suffering 
at Time 1 uniquely accounted for 8% of the variance in meaningful work at Time 2 (p < 
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.01) while perpetration-based moral suffering did not uniquely account for any of the 
variance in meaningful work at Time 2 (sr2 = .002, n.s.). Therefore, only Hypothesis 2a 
was supported; witness-based moral suffering was the only predictor to consistently 
contribute unique variance in predicting meaningful work.  
Counterproductive Work Behaviors 
Hypothesis 3, which stated that the moral suffering dimensions assessed at Time 1 
would uniquely predict increased counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) at Time 2, 
was partially supported. The Time 1 moral suffering product terms were entered into the 
model predicting CWBs at Time 2. The model fit the data adequately (χ2 (115) = 
306.172, p < .05, RMSEA = .088, TLI = .893, CFI =.910, and SRMR =.056) and 
explained 9% of the variance in counterproductive work behaviors (f 2=.10). Regression 
estimates showed that perpetration-based moral suffering had a statistically significant 
relationship with engaging in CWBs (ꞵ = .38, p < .01). The results were still significant 
even after controlling for age and tenure, however, were no longer significant when 
controlling for Time 1 CWBs.  
The model was refit to the data using equality constraints. The paths between 
witness-based moral suffering and perpetration-based moral suffering were constrained to 
be equal in predicting counterproductive work behaviors. The results of the Wald test 
suggest that there was a significant difference among the standardized regression 
coefficients (W = 5.03, p < .05). According to the Wald test, the relative effects of the 
moral suffering predictors on counterproductive work behaviors were not equivalent. The 
constrained model decreased perpetration-based moral suffering from ꞵ = .38 in the 
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unconstrainted model to ꞵ = .14 in the constrained model. Further, the semipartial 
correlations indicated that perpetration-based moral suffering at Time 1 uniquely 
accounted for 13% of the variance in counterproductive work behaviors at Time 2 (p < 
.01), while witness-based moral suffering did not uniquely accounted any of the variance 
in counterproductive work behaviors at Time 2 (sr2 = .006, n.s.). Therefore, only 
Hypothesis 3b was supported.  
Structural Models of Perceived Occupational Stigma Moderating the Relationships 
Between Moral Suffering and Outcomes (H4 - 6) 
The second set of SEMs examined perceived occupational stigma as a moderator 
of the relationships between moral suffering and the three outcomes (H4-6). The 
interaction terms were created through the double-mean centering technique (Lin et al., 
2010) using the ‘indProd’ function of the semTools package (Jorgensen, 
Pornprasertmanit, Schoemann, & Rosseel, 2021). The predictor and moderator indicators 
were mean centered, then ranked in terms of relative factor loading. The indicator item 
with the highest factor loading on each moral suffering factor was multiplied by the 
indicator variable with the highest factor loading for the perceived occupational stigma 
items, resulting in 5 product variables. These final cross products were mean centered 
again. Each SEM interaction model was first assessed using just the main effects 
(witness-based and perpetration-based moral suffering, perceived occupational stigma) 
and the interaction terms, then a second model which included the control variables, age 
and tenure, as well as the Time 1 outcomes, were added to the model. If the interactions 
between the moral suffering dimensions and perceived occupational stigma were 
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significant, tests of simple slopes were conducted at low (-1 SD), medium (M), and high 
levels of stigma (+1 SD).  Regression estimates are displayed in Table 8. 
Mental Health Symptoms 
Hypothesis 4 proposed that high levels of perceived occupational stigma at Time 
1 would moderate the relationship between moral suffering at Time 1 and mental health 
symptoms at Time 2. Due to the high number of parameters that were needed to be 
estimated, the model did not fit the data well, (χ2 (969) = 3389.08, p < .05, RMSEA = 
.106, TLI = .734, CFI =.751, and SRMR =.06). The predictors explained 35% of the 
variance in mental health symptoms (f 2=.54). Regression estimates showed that there 
were main effects for both witness-based moral suffering (ꞵ = .58) and perpetration-based 
moral suffering (ꞵ= .84, p <.01), as well as a main effect for perceived occupational 
stigma (ꞵ= .79, p < .01), predicting Time 2 mental health symptoms.  
There was also a significant interaction between witness-based moral suffering 
and perceived occupational stigma predicting mental health symptoms at Time 2 (ꞵ = -
.68, p <.05). The simple slopes were significant at low (-1 SD) and medium (M) levels of 
perceived occupational stigma (p’s < .05), but not at high levels. Therefore, the 
relationship between witness-based moral suffering and mental health symptoms 
primarily occurred if employees perceived that they worked in a less stigmatized 
occupation. Similarly, the interaction between perpetration-based moral suffering and 
perceived occupational stigma was also a significant predictor of mental health 
symptoms. The simple slopes were significant at low (-1 SD) and medium (M) levels of 
perceived occupational stigma (p’s < .05), but not at high levels. Therefore, the 
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relationship between perpetration-based moral suffering and mental health symptoms 
primarily occurred if employees perceived that they worked in a less stigmatized 
occupation (ꞵ= -.76, p < .01). The relationship was not significant after controlling for 
age, tenure, and Time 1 mental health symptoms.  
It is important to note that the standardized regression estimates for the interaction 
terms were negative, whereas all of the main effects had positive regression estimates, 
suggesting initial evidence of suppression. Statistical suppression occurs when at least 
one predictor has a standardized regression estimate (ꞵ) that is larger in magnitude or has 
a reverse sign than its respective raw correlation with the outcome (Lubin, 1957; Velicer, 
1978). Witness-based moral suffering had a main effect of ꞵ = .58 and perpetration-based 
moral suffering had a main effect of ꞵ = .84 in predicting mental health symptoms, 
whereas the raw correlations were much lower (r = .34, r = .22, respectively). 
Additionally, when the witness- and perpetration-based moral suffering variables were 
entered into separate models with perceived occupational stigma and the respective 
interaction term, there was no significant main effects or interactions found predicting 
mental health symptoms. In summary, the interactions were considered statistical artifacts 
and not meaningful in interpretation, thus Hypothesis 4 was not supported.   
Meaningful Work 
Hypothesis 5 suggested that high levels of perceived occupational stigma at Time 
1 would moderate the relationship between moral suffering at Time 1 and meaningful 
work at Time 2. Due to the high number of parameters that were needed to be estimated, 
the model did not fit the data well, (χ2 (720) = 2795.89, p < .05, RMSEA = .120, TLI = 
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.736, CFI =.756 and SRMR =.056) with the predictors explaining 20.3% of the variance 
in meaningful work (f 2=.25). Within the full model, there was a main effect for 
perpetration-based moral suffering (ꞵ = - .51, p < .05) and perceived occupational stigma 
(ꞵ= -.66, p < .01). There was also a significant interaction between perpetration-based 
moral suffering and perceived occupational stigma predicting meaningful work at Time 2 
(ꞵ = .65, p < .01). The simple slopes were significant at low (-1 SD) and medium (M) 
levels of perceived occupational stigma, but not at high levels. Therefore, the relationship 
between perpetration-based moral suffering and meaningful work primarily occurred if 
employees perceived that they worked in a less stigmatized occupation. The relationship 
was still significant even after controlling for age and tenure, but not when controlling for 
Time 1 meaningful work.  
However, similar to the previous model’s interactions, there appears to be 
evidence of suppression (Lubin, 1957; Velicer, 1978). The standardized regression 
estimate for perpetration-based moral suffering predicting meaningful work transformed 
from a negative relationship in the main effects, to a positive relationship for the 
interaction term with perceived occupational stigma. Additionally, the bivariate 
correlation between perpetration-based moral suffering and meaningful work was not 
significant. Further, when perpetration-based moral suffering and its respective 
interaction term were entered into a separate model on their own (without witness-based 
moral suffering predictors) there was not a significant main effect for perpetration-based 
moral suffering or a significant interaction predicting meaningful work. In summary, the 
interaction was considered a statistical artifact and not meaningful to interpret.  
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Counterproductive Work Behaviors 
Hypothesis 6 suggested that high levels of perceived occupational stigma at Time 
1 would moderate the relationships between moral suffering at Time 1 and 
counterproductive work behaviors assessed at Time 2. Similar to the previous models, 
due to the increased set of parameters estimated, the model did not fit the data well, (χ2 
(448) = 2051.143 p < .05, RMSEA = .150, TLI = .648, CFI =.682, and SRMR =.066). 
There was a main effect between perceived occupational stigma at Time 1 on CWBs at 
Time 2 (ꞵ = .44, p < .05). However, there were no main effects found for the moral 
suffering components and no significant interactions within the full model. Thus, 
Hypothesis 6 was not supported.   
 Although each model was assessed in terms of its fit indices, it is important to 
acknowledge that the interaction models had ‘poor fit’ according to standard cutoffs. 
While poor fit indices indicate that the model does not strongly fit the data, this does not 
mean that the models do not represent the general trends in the data. Additionally, SEM 
literature typically relies on cut off scores that were created by Hu and Bentler (1999; χ2 p 
> .05, RMSEA < .08, CFI ≥ .90, and SRMR < .08). However recent research has noted 
that these standard cut offs are not necessarily generalizable to all models and data types 
(McNeish, An, & Hancock, 2018). McNeish and colleagues (2018) have coined the term 
‘reliability paradox’ noting that model fit cutoffs penalize models that contain high factor 
loadings. The authors state that “although [Hu and Bentler] manipulated many conditions 
when deriving their cutoff values, the strength of the standardized factor loadings was 
kept constant throughout their entire study… [where] all of these conditions were tested 
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with factor loadings that were always near 0.70” (p. 44). The authors found that when 
factor loadings are low (.40) or high (.90) the model fit indices varied significantly in 
what would be consider ‘good model fit’ and thus researchers should be warry when 
making conclusions about model fit when the loadings are not equivalent to .70. Instead, 
McNeish et al. (2018) suggest that poor fit does not matter as much as the loadings do, 
model fit indices should be interpreted in the context of your average standardized 
loading. Within the current study, the average standardized factor loadings for witness-
based moral suffering, perpetration-based moral suffering, and perceived occupational 
stigma were greater than .70 and thus the model fit indices were liked to be penalized.   
The Implications of COVID19 
During the time of this study, the COVID19 pandemic was infecting the world 
and interfering with individuals work lives. Participants were asked some follow-up 
questions to ensure that the study variables were not influenced by these changes. The 
majority of participants responded that their work has not changed due to the pandemic 
(67%), followed by 38% were working from home, 20% worked some days in office 
while others were at home, 2% reported working at a different location (that is not their 
home), 11% were working reduced hours, 9% were working increased hours, and .5% of 
participants reported that they were not currently working due to the pandemic. 
Additionally, after participants responded to the moral suffering items, they were asked 
“To what extent did your responses to the previous questions refer to situations that were 
caused by COVID19? (ie. If the pandemic did not exist, would these issues still occur at 
work?)”. Participants reported that the pandemic had no effect at all on their responses 
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(40%), a little (27%), a moderate amount (20%), a lot (8%), and a great deal (5%) in 
regard to the moral injury section of questions. Similar results were found following the 
moral distress questionnaire, participants reported that the pandemic had no effect at all 
on their responses (48%), a little (25%), a moderate amount (13%), a lot (8%), and a 




CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 While the present study did not provide empirical support for all of the proposed 
hypotheses, the findings from the moral suffering measurement model expand the 
knowledge of the construct of moral suffering within the literature. Prior research has 
utilized the terms moral injury and moral distress in inconsistent ways (Sugrue, 2019). 
There is clear need for clarification within the moral suffering literature to distinguish 
how these terms are related and whether they are assessing unique constructs. The present 
study is one of the first to compare the experiences of moral injury and moral distress in 
one large sample. The findings demonstrate the factor structure of moral suffering, 
relationships with mental health symptoms, meaningful work and counterproductive 
work behaviors and some initial evidence for interaction effects with perceived 
occupational stigma.  
The Measurement of Moral Suffering 
 In the first set of analyses, the measurement model of moral suffering was 
thoroughly examined. While the main research question of the current study was to 
investigate the dimensionality of moral injury and moral distress as single or separate 
entities, the results indicated that moral injury and moral distress are not distinct 
constructs. Instead, there was a different two-factor structure present within the moral 
suffering model. Whereas previous research has separated the constructs by the content 
of the suffering (harm versus judgement), the current study provides evidence that the 
items are assessing the same construct. Instead, employees appear to differentiate moral 
suffering involving circumstances where an individual  witnesses others at work engaging 
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in decisions or actions that violate their personal sense of right and wrong, versus feeling 
forced to engage in those actions themselves and being a perpetrator in the event.  
The findings support previous research that has suggested that outcomes may 
differ depending on the nature of one’s involvement in an event (Jameton, 1993; 
Drescher et al., 2011; Jordan et al., 2017; Litz et al., 2009, Stein, et al., 2016). Within his 
conceptualization of moral distress, Jameton (1993) described how moral distress is most 
often a result of an individual’s sense of moral responsibility for the situation, despite 
whether the individual was directly responsible for the event. He stated that whether the 
individual was making the decision themselves or having to witness others engage in acts 
they disagree with, the individual perceives an obligation to do what’s right as a 
participant in the situation. Although Jameton (1984; 1993) proposed the distinction 
between perpetrating and witnessing events in his original work, the moral distress 
literature has not prioritized this distinction.  
Although both witness- and perpetration-based actions are embedded within the 
common definition of moral injury (see Hodgson & Carey, 2017 for a table of 
definitions), assessments vary in the factorial separation of witness- and perpetration-
based moral injury. The measurement models underlying moral injury measures vary 
between one (MIQ-M, Currier et al., 2013; MIQ-T; Currier et al., 2015), two (Jordan et 
al., 2017; Litz et al., 2018; MIES, Nash et al., 2013; Yeterian et al., 2019), or three factor 
structures (Braitman et  al., 2018; Bryan et al., 2014; 2016), with inconsistent factor 
labels amongst studies. For example, the Morally Injurious Events Scale (MIES; Nash et 
al., 2013) includes two factors describing perceived transgressions and perceived 
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betrayals where both witness- and perpetration-based moral injury were collapsed into 
the transgression factor, whereas Jordan et al. (2017) utilized the same measure but 
removed the witness-based items.  
The findings of the current study support the measurement structure by Litz et al. 
(2018) and Yeterian et al. (2019), who conceptualized the two-factor structure of moral 
injury as Moral Injury-Self (reflecting perpetration-based items in the current study) and 
Moral Injury-Other (reflecting witness-based items in the current study). There is 
inconsistent research supporting the factor structure of moral injury and thus future 
research is needed to clarify the measurement model of moral injury that does not 
confound with other constructs. Results could differ due to various referents and should 
be considered in further analyses or scale development. The person that a participant 
witnesses engaging in moral suffering (coworker verses a supervisor) or the target to 
which the action effects (other coworkers, clients, or oneself) may influence the impact 
on outcomes. For example, moral suffering may result from just one individual at work or 
many individuals reflecting on the organizational culture. Future research should 
investigate the context to which circumstances arise and the impact on individual 
wellbeing and retaliation behaviors.  
As previously stated by Williamson et al. (2018) “some existing measures do not 
include exposure to a variety of [potentially morally injurious experiences] or confound 
[potentially morally injurious experiences] exposure with the psychological effects of 
exposure” (p. 345). One of the most often utilized scales is the Moral Injury 
Questionnaire (MIQ; Currier et al, 2013; 2015) where both the frequency of events and 
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the effects of exposure are combined into one measure. As previous research has 
demonstrated the differing effects of frequency and intensity items, measures that include 
both elements may be misrepresenting the construct. Additionally, many measures 
include a factor of perceived betrayal (e.g., Bryan et al., 2014; 2016; Joran et al., 2017; 
Nash et al., 2013). However, it is hard to conceptually distinguish between perceived 
betrayal and witness- and perpetration-based moral injury. Perceived betrayal has been 
defined as “perceived deception or treachery by others,” which could result from 
witnessing another individual engaging in a ‘treacherous’ action or feeling deceived and 
forced to engage in actions. The perceived betrayal items may load on their own factor 
solely due to having the same stem in the three items (e.g., “I feel betrayed by 
(leaders/coworkers)”). 
The measurement problem may also be due to the separation of the moral injury 
and moral distress domains. The current study provided evidence for a single moral 
suffering construct that includes both the domains of moral injury and moral distress. The 
inconsistent factor structure findings within the moral injury literature may be due to 
some measures incorporating aspects of distress while others do not. Future research 
should aim to develop a comprehensive scale that encompasses the entire domain of 
moral suffering while accounting for self- and other-orientated actions. 
Moral Suffering Predicting the Three Outcomes  
Due to the complexity of the structural equation models, the moral suffering 
components were examined as product scores of the frequency and the degree to which 
the situation caused suffering. Previous researchers have examined the implications of 
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assessing the frequency and degree to which moral suffering differs in how they impact 
psychological outcomes (Corley, 2002; Currier et al., 2018; Ganz & Berkovitz, 2012; 
Griffin et al., 2019; Koenig et al., 2018; Mobley et al., 2007; Ohnishi et al., 2010). 
Therefore, the evaluation of how often an individual is exposed to an event in 
combination with the degree of distress experienced provides a comprehensive measure 
of the moral suffering experience. Following the work of Corley (1995), the product 
terms were developed by multiplying the frequency item with its respective intensity 
item. Preliminary results assessed the frequency and intensity scores as separate variables 
within the model, however the models were under-identified and produced very poor 
model fit indices. The relationships that were found within the preliminary assessment of 
these separated variables were replicated with the product terms. 
 The first set of hypotheses proposed that an individual’s mental health symptoms, 
meaningful work and counterproductive work behaviors will be predicted by moral 
suffering. Despite significant bivariate correlations between both the moral suffering 
dimensions and outcomes, the SEM analyses indicated that only one dimension 
contributed unique variance to the outcomes in each model. The results demonstrate that 
when accounting for one moral suffering dimension, the other does not provide additional 
predictive value. The findings suggest that future research should continue to evaluate the 
dimensionality of moral suffering and attempt to parcel out the unique contributions of 
each dimension.   
Furthermore, Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3b were supported. Specifically, individuals 
who witnessed others at work engaging in behaviors that conflicted with their moral 
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values reported higher mental health symptoms (H1a) and lower meaningful work (H2a). 
Past research has demonstrated the relationship between moral suffering and mental 
health (Backholm & Idås, 2015; Colville et al., 2019; Lamiani et al., 2018). Individuals 
have reported increased guilt from knowing the right course of action was not taken and 
shame for being associated with the event or organization. The conflict of believing the 
right course of action and observing the opposite occur, can interfere with employee’s 
trust in others causing doubt in other’s intensions. The current study contributes to the 
literature by replicating previous findings that indicated witness-based moral suffering 
uniquely predicts increased mental health symptoms in the broader working population. 
Previous research found that witnessing others engage in events that caused moral 
suffering contributed more to PTSD symptoms than when the individual was involved in 
the event themselves (Bryan et al., 2016; Fitzpatrick & Wilson, 1999).  
Similarly, the results of Hypothesis 2a found that higher witness-based moral 
suffering predicted lower meaningful work. The findings suggest that moral suffering can 
influence how an individual perceives their occupational purpose. Prior research has 
found that moral suffering can increase an individual’s doubts about oneself and how 
they make sense of the world (Currier, Holland, & Malott, 2015). Through witnessing 
events that conflict with one’s moral values, an individual loses faith in others to act in an 
appropriate ‘just’ manner. The findings were not significant for perpetration-based moral 
suffering. When individuals feel forced to engage in behaviors they do not agree with, the 
individual has the ability to rationalize the action or inability to act as they are aware of 
the constraints. The individual acknowledges that there are protocols or rules set in place 
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that are forcing them to perpetrate in the behavior, and thus rationalizing the event may 
not diminish one’s perception of self-worth in their role.  
If an individual observes others acting in ways that conflict with their own 
personal values, they may not be fully aware of the circumstance that the other person is 
limited to. The Fundamental Attribution Error (Ross, 1977) describes how individuals 
tend to over emphasize a person’s dispositional traits and underestimate the situational 
circumstances when observing other’s behaviors. One study assessing the attribution in 
moral responsibility found that individuals were more likely to assign responsibility to an 
observed actor, the more the actor identified with the situation, “even when the action 
was performed under constraints so powerful that no other behavioral option was 
available” (Woolfolk, et al., 2006, p. 283). Assignment of responsibility based on 
witnessing others engage in actions that are against one’s beliefs can affect one’s 
meaning making system.  
Interestingly, perpetration-based moral suffering was only a unique predictor of 
organizationally deviant behaviors. CWBs involve personal acts of withdrawal that 
contribute to organization inefficiency such as coming in late and taking longer breaks. 
Litz et al. (2009) described that when individuals experience continued conflict between 
events that occur and their moral schema, individuals tend to ruminate on their actions, 
and due to self-unforgiveness, exhibit withdrawal behaviors. Alternatively, CWBs also 
involve stealing and misuse of company resources. Bryan et al. (2016) found that 
perpetration-based moral suffering was most strongly predictive of pessimism and anger. 
Individuals may seek to engage in retaliation behaviors in order to ‘get back at’ the 
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organization for putting them in a position where they have to act against what they 
believed was right (Ahmed & Khan, 2016). An individual may steal resources in order to 
balance the field. The nonsignificant findings for witness-based moral suffering may be 
due to witnessing the acts of others as organizationally deviant, and thus the individual is 
less likely to engage in additional CWBs themselves in order to avoid continuing the 
problem. Witnessing based moral suffering serves as a deterrent for engaging in CWBs 
oneself. 
Although CWBs are typically defined as employee deviance, this negative 
connotation may not hold true in the context of moral suffering. When individuals act out 
against the organization, the refusal to endorse actions that violate their morals could be 
seen as a form of moral courage, standing up for one’s beliefs (Sekerka, Bagozzi & 
Charnigo, 2009). Some CWB items such as item 7, “Neglected to follow your boss's 
instructions” may be deviant in an ambiguous circumstance, however when considering a 
situation where the individual feels the action as being ‘wrong’, the individual is refusing 
to endorse violating their value system. Similarly, an individual could seek support as in 
item 9 “discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person” in 
order to reduce the guilt from engaging in those actions. Future research should continue 
to investigate the interplay between moral suffering and CWBs with the consideration of 
individuals refusing to conduct work tasks due to the moral conflict experienced.  
The Moderating Effect of Perceived Occupational Stigma 
The second set of hypotheses asserted that perceived occupational stigma would 
magnify the effects of moral suffering on the outcomes. While Hypotheses 4a, 4b, and 5b 
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were statistically supported, the results indicated suppression effects had occurred based 
on the inflated standardized regression coefficients in comparison to their raw 
correlations. Suppression occurs when there is an increase in the prediction of a criterion 
by including another predictor, which increases the variance explained due to accounting 
for residual errors (Lubin, 1957; Velicer, 1978). Researchers have also demonstrated that 
the probability of suppression is increased with latent variables, two wave models, and 
when the latent variables are corrected for measurement errors (Maassen & Bakker, 
2001). Thus, the current study utilized indicators to represent the latent variables, with 
two time points, and using the Satorra-Bentler corrections for nonnormally.  
In order to provide additional evidence of suppression, witness- and perpetration-
based moral suffering were entered into separate models with perceived occupational 
stigma and the respective interaction term, resulting in no significant main effects or 
interactions found. Thus, the interactions were classified as statistical artifacts and not 
meaningful. It is evident that the moral suffering variables acted as suppressors due to 
their moderate relationship, inflating the variance explained by the predictors. Perceived 
occupational stigma had moderate correlations with all study variables and thus future 
research should aim to replicate the study’s hypotheses with different temporal separation 
between waves of data collection and attempt to capture the incremental validity of each 
moral suffering dimension by reducing the overlap in the prediction on outcomes. 
Another reason the suppression effect may have occurred is the multifaceted 
nature of perceived occupational stigma. Researchers have suggested that perceived 
occupational stigma is a multidimensional construct involving physical, social, and moral 
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‘taint’ (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; Hughes, 1951). Workers within each of these 
categories may experience moral suffering to differing degrees and may be impacted 
differently due to their classification. Additionally, Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) 
described how occupational prestige can form as a buffer to perceived stigma. 
Occupational prestige is a composite of status, power, quality of work, education, and 
income that forms a ‘status shield’ (Stenross & Kleinman, 1989; Treiman, 1977). For 
example, a lawyer is considered to have a ‘moral’ stigma in that their work may involve 
defending a violent murderer, however, a lawyer also has high occupational prestige due 
to the education needed for the position and wealth that results. The suppression results 
of the current study may have been influenced due to the broad classification of perceived 
occupational stigma without piecing apart the unique influences that each type of stigma 
may involve and whether the occupation has prestige. Future research should consider the 
dynamic relationships of perceived occupational stigma’s impact on moral suffering.  
Implications of Findings  
 The present study contributes to the literature in several ways. As previously 
noted by other researchers (Sugrue, 2019; Williamson et al., 2018; 2020), there is a lack 
of research examining moral suffering in a variety of industries. The majority of 
published studies have been conducted in military and healthcare settings. The current 
study obtained a matched sample of 479 participants from 20 different industries in a 
variety of occupational settings that acknowledged experiencing some degree of moral 
suffering. With findings demonstrating the prevalence of moral suffering occurring 
across industries, future research should continue to assess moral suffering outside of the 
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military and healthcare domains in order to understand other occupational health 
outcomes that these industries may be facing due to moral suffering. Occupations that 
have differing degrees of power, agency, and status could impact the occurrence of moral 
suffering and the extent to which outcomes are affected. Future research should consider 
ways to break down job types further and examine what job factors may increase the 
likelihood of moral suffering to occur. Other constructs such as organizational culture 
would provide a deeper understanding of the larger organizational outcomes that are due 
to moral suffering. The current study provided evidence that moral suffering exists in the 
broader population and future research should continue to investigate the various ways 
moral suffering impacts specific occupational industries. 
Additionally, the large sample size contributes to the strength of the SEMs that 
are required to detect and appropriately interpret effects increases (Barrett, 2007; Kline, 
2015). Prior research has relied on cross-sectional designs, limiting the knowledge of 
causal outcomes of moral suffering (Sugrue, 2019). The current study assessed all study 
outcomes three months following the initial intake of exposure and effects of moral 
suffering.  
 This study also adds to previous research in that the measurement of moral 
suffering was examined more in depth than previous studies. The current study is one of 
the first and only to assess moral injury and moral distress in one model, providing 
evidence of the overall measurement structure of moral suffering. The current study 
utilized a random split half sample method for examining the two-factor structure of 
witness- and perpetration-based moral suffering with adequate model fit indices. The 
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findings provide evidence for the future assessment of moral suffering to consider the 
inclusion of both domains of distress and injury and with the focus on the act of the 
individual rather than the context to which the event occurred. Additionally, future 
research should consider using a single term such as moral suffering when referring to 
work obligations that conflict with one’s values, in order to minimize the confusion 
within the literature that suggests moral injury and moral distress are separate constructs. 
 Another strength of the current study was all of the findings remained significant 
even after controlling for age and tenure. The outcomes could have been more salient as 
individuals increase in age and the longer an individual works within their career and thus 
could have influenced the hypothesized relationships. Over time, individuals may 
gradually become ‘numb’ to the organizational regulations and thus no longer be affected 
by moral suffering. Age and tenure did not affect the findings within the current study. 
However, the findings were no longer significant when controlling for Time 1 outcomes. 
Because individual strain measures are typically stable over time, a large proportion of 
the variance of the dependent variable is already explained. Thus, there was little 
variance left to be explained after controlling for Time 1 outcomes. It is not surprising 
that when controlling for mental health symptoms, meaningful work, and 
counterproductive work behaviors at Time 1, there was not enough variance to account 
for at Time 2. The Time 1 and Time 2 predictors were highly correlated with one another 
and the time frame between the two assessment periods may have been too small to 




 While the current study has expanded the knowledge of moral suffering, there are 
a few limitations that are important to note and highlight areas for future research. First, 
although the diversity of the sample is seen as a strength of the current study, the 
participant pool was collected through an online data source, Mturk. Mturk has been 
established as a credible source of information for occupational health research (Michel 
et al., 2018) and representative of the US working population (Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 
2013; Michel, O’Neill, Hartman, & Lorys, 2018). However, researchers have warned 
against convenience sampling issues that the site may provide (Paolacci & Chandler, 
2014). Future research should aim to replicate the findings of the current study with a true 
random sample of the population. 
Additionally, although the measurement model of moral suffering was examined 
in depth through inclusion of previously established measurement components (injury, 
distress, witnessing, perpetrating, frequency and intensity), the model still relied on initial 
construct validity of the original measures. The moral injury and distress measures were 
obtained from three previously validated scales but were developed for a specific sample 
and a limited definition. Based on the findings of the current study, future researchers 
should aim to develop a measure of moral suffering that encompasses the full domain of 
moral violations that may occur at work. Researchers are encouraged to conduct an 
extensive review of the literature, informing the development of structured interviews 
with individuals in a wide range of occupations, and develop a comprehensive measure 
that increases the content validity of the scale.  A high-quality assessment of moral 
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suffering is needed that has the ability to assess the construct in a variety of occupations. 
Future research should seek to clarify the definition and measurement of moral suffering 
in order to understand the experience employees are facing rather than continued 
adaption of potentially flawed existing measures. 
 Another consideration of the current study is based on the language used for the 
intensity scale. While there is a clear need to distinguish the frequency of events 
occurring and the degree to which the event caused moral suffering, the language used to 
target the intensity may not have fully captured the experience of moral suffering. 
Following the guidance of previous researchers (e.g., Braitman et al., 2018; Glasberg et 
al., 2006), each situation was followed by an item that read, “to what degree did this 
situation upset you?” however, moral suffering involves feelings of guilt, shame, and 
helplessness that may not have been captured within the term “upset”. Future research 
should assess moral suffering with the technique conducted by Braitman et al. (2018). 
The authors utilized a modified version of the MIQ-M (Currier, Holland, Drescher, & 
Foy, 2015) but followed each situation with five questions that assessed the degree to 
which each situation caused them to: 1) “feel guilt”, 2) “feel shame”, 3) “have difficulties 
with forgiving myself”, 4) “have difficulties forgiving others”, and 5) “become 
withdrawn” for each experience. Future research should incorporate this methodology to 
ensure that the full domain of moral suffering is captured. 
 Another limitation of this study was due to influences outside of the study’s 
control. During the time of this study, a global pandemic was infecting the world, 
interfering with individuals lives inside and outside of the work domain. Researchers 
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have described the implications that COVID19 has had on daily work hours, work role 
expectations, work-life balance and new safety protocols (Borges et al., 2020; Cacchione, 
2020). One potential impact of the pandemic on the present study is related to work from 
home regulations. While individuals work from home, they are less likely to experience 
witness-based moral suffering as the circumstances are not as visibly present with 
individuals working in separate locations. Additionally, the impact of perpetration-based 
moral suffering may have been intensified as individuals were working alone and could 
have felt more compelled to engage in decision making that violated their morals without 
the support of their coworkers. In some industries where employees were able to continue 
work in person, extreme safety protocols and restrictions were in place that could have 
also increased the likelihood of moral suffering for both dimensions. However, data was 
collected on the impact of COVID19 on the study variables (see Results) and participants 
generally reported that the situations were not unique to the pandemic. While the 
additional information collected on COVID19 changes were helpful to understand how 
work has changed during the data collection period it is likely that the pandemic may 
have increased the strength of the relationships between moral suffering and mental 
health symptoms, meaningful work and counterproductive work behaviors. Future 
research is needed to investigate these relationships when life returns to ‘normal.’ 
Conclusion  
The current study has significant theoretical and practical applications to the field 
of Industrial-Organizational Psychology. First, the diversity of professions that were 
represented within the present study has expanded upon the literature of moral suffering 
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by demonstrating the frequency and intensity of distress experienced in the workplace 
beyond healthcare and military contexts. In addition, the current study has clarified the 
dimensionality of moral suffering to include witness- and perpetration-based moral 
suffering rather than the traditional terms of moral injury and moral distress. The current 
study has provided researchers with a broader understanding of the impact of moral 
suffering on mental health symptoms, meaningful work, and counterproductive work 
behaviors.  
Numerous authors have discussed strategies for addressing moral distress and 
moral injury (see Epstein, 2010 and Litz et al., 2009 for a review). Furthermore, 
researchers have begun to identify ‘missing’ components of interventions aimed to treat 
PTSD in military samples (Gray et al., 2012; Litz et al., 2009), it may also be that other 
interventions conducted in the workplace aimed at reducing stress may be overlooking 
the intense experience of moral suffering. The practical value of the findings is evident as 
they can provide an understanding of the impact of moral wrongdoing conducted in the 
workplace.  
Within her review of moral distress, Epstein (2010) suggested that intervening on 
outcomes associated with moral suffering achieves several goals such as raising 
awareness to the ‘silent harm’ that individuals face and reduces the threat to individuals 
personal and professional integrity which contributes to their sense of meaning. While 
not every stressor can be removed from the workplace, organizations that acknowledge 
the circumstances that surround a moral dissonance, can provide support and resources to 
their employees to flatten the incremental effects of moral suffering. Organizations can 
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minimize the perceived powerlessness and helplessness that surrounds moral suffering, 
through giving a voice to those experiencing dissonance regardless of the industry 
(Epstein & Delgado, 2010). Research has demonstrated the impact of employee voice on 
reporting ethical issues leading to turnover intentions (Burnett, 2019). Organizations 
should ensure that there are procedures in place for employees to express their concerns 
when moral suffering occurs and that the appropriate attention is placed on addressing 
these concerns. Considering work is a socially rich environment where individuals 
identify and represent the career to outsiders, organizations should be aware of the 
internal struggle employees may be facing and what changes can be made to reduce the 
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Figure 2. Structural Equation Models for Hypotheses 1-3. The figure represents the 
conceptual SEMs demonstrating measurement structure and regression paths. Errors, 
disturbances, and control variables are not displayed.  Each dependent variable was 
modeled on its own with the predictor variables. Witness- and perpetration-based moral 





Figure 3. Structural Equation Model for Hypotheses 4. The figure represents the 
conceptual SEM demonstrating measurement structure and regression paths. Errors, 
disturbances, and control variables are not displayed. Witness- and perpetration-based 





Figure 4. Structural Equation Model for Hypotheses 5. The figure represents the 
conceptual SEM demonstrating measurement structure and regression paths. Errors, 
disturbances, and control variables are not displayed. Witness- and perpetration-based 





Figure 5. Structural Equation Model for Hypotheses 6. The figure represents the 
conceptual SEM demonstrating measurement structure and regression paths. Errors, 
disturbances, and control variables are not displayed. Witness- and perpetration-based 




















APPENDIX A – A Measure of Morally Injurious Events  
Considering your experiences at your job, select the choice that indicates how often you 
have experienced each of the following situations over the past 3 months.  
 
For the items that contain ‘someone,’ ‘others’ or ’people’ at work, refer to anyone you 
are in contact with (e.g., your coworkers, clients, patients) on a regular basis. 
 
Frequency (#) Response Scale: 
 
1= Never, have no experience 
2= Rarely, once over the three months    
3= Sometimes, more than once over the three months     
4= Often, every month 
5= Very often, every week 
6= Always, everyday 
Intensity (B) Response Scale: 
 
1= Not at all  
2 = Very little 
3 = A little 
4 = Moderately 
5= Quite a bit 
6= Extremely  
Items indicated with a * are perpetration-based items 
Over the past 3 months…. 
1) I have witnessed actions taken by management in my organization that betrayed my 
trust. 
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
2) I have seen people taking revenge for actions that have happened at work. 
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
*3) I have failed to protect someone at work from unnecessary harm. 
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
4) I have seen someone unnecessarily harmed at work. 
 B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
*5) I have been able to leave my work psychologically or physically safe when I know 
others at work cannot. 
 B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
*6) I failed to take action in helping someone at work. 
 B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
7) I saw a coworker engage in actions that I did not agree with. 
 B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
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*8) I have not had access to the resources or materials I needed to do my job in a way that 
protected other people at work. 
 B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
9) I have seen people at work suffer because of actions involving other employees at my 
organization. 
 B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
10) I saw mistakes made by my coworkers or other employees that led to other people 
suffering at work. 
B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
 
The measure was adapted from Currier et al. (2015)  
1)Things I saw/experienced things that left me feeling betrayed or let-down by 
educational leaders. 
2) I saw people taking revenge/retribution for things that happened. 
3) I feel guilt over failing to protect a student. 
4) I saw the harm of an innocent student. 
5) I feel guilt for being able to return to safety at the end of the workday when many 
students cannot. 
6) As a teacher, I had to make decisions at times when I didn’t know the right thing to do. 
7) I felt betrayed or let-down by my colleagues. 
8) As a teacher, I did not have access to the resources or materials I needed to care for my 
students. 
9) Seeing so much suffering in the students has changed me. 
10) I saw students suffer because of incident(s) involving teachers or other school 
personnel. 
11) I came to realize that I am no longer affected by violence. 





APPENDIX B – A Measure of Morally Distressing Events  
Considering your experiences at your job, select the choice that indicates how often you 
have experienced each of the following situations over the past 3 months. 
  
For the items that contain ‘someone,’ ‘others’ or ’people’ at work, refer to anyone you 
are in contact with (e.g., your coworkers, clients, patients) on a regular basis. 
 
Frequency (#) Response Scale: 
 
1= Never, have no experience 
2= Rarely, once over the three months    
3= Sometimes, more than once over the three months     
4= Often, every month 
5= Very often, every week 
6= Always, everyday 
Intensity (B) Response 
Scale: 
 
1= Not at all  
2 = Very little 
3 = A little 
5 = Moderately 
5= Quite a bit 
6= Extremely  
Items indicated with a * are perpetration-based items 
Over the past 3 months…. 
*1. I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’ directions, which were 
against my professional opinion. 
 B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
*2. I have considered whether to bend the rules to do something that I believed was right 
despite being against the organization’s rules. 
 B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
*3. I have been forced to do my job according to my organization’s protocols, which 
were against my professional opinion. 
 B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
*4. I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’ directions and against 
my conscience. 
 B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
*5. I have been forced to relocate/redistribute my work to somewhere/someone else that I 
believed was unsuitable. 
 B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
6. There have been situations where I believed management's interests were in 
contradiction with the purpose of my work 
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 B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
7. I have seen coworkers behave in contradiction with the best interests of our 
clients/patients/customers 
 B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
8. There have been situations where management has acted superficially and did not 
serve the best interests of clients/patients/customers 
 B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
9. I have seen a colleague behave in an inappropriate way at work that I did not have the 
ability to prevent  
 B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
*10. I was in a situation where there was an expectation for me to conceal or to give false 
information. 
 B) To what extent did this situation upset you?  
 
The measure was adapted from Eizenberg et al (2009)  
1. I do not have enough time to provide the patient with the care that he/she deserves. 
2. I was forced to provide care to my patient according to the supervising nurse directions 
against my professional opinion. 
3. I pondered whether to tell the patient (who did not have the means) that he can 
purchase an expensive medication not included in the ‘‘medication basket’’. 
4. I was forced to invade the patient’s privacy due to inadequate conditions (e.g., a patient 
in a corridor. 
5. I was forced to provide care to the patient according to the physician’s directions 
against my professional opinion. 
6. I was forced to provide an incomplete treatment to the patient owing to work overload. 
7. I was forced to keep a patient, who needed a treatment, waiting, due to lack of time. 
8. I did not give the patient sufficient attention due to lack of time. 
9. I was forced to treat the patient according to the physician’s directions against my 
conscience. 
10. I pondered what to do while witnessing deficient treatment provided by another nurse 
or a physician. 
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11. I was forced to ignore the patient’s questions because the physician was supposed to 
address them. 
12. I was forced to ignore the clients/customer patient’s family questions because my 
supervisor the physician was supposed to address them. 
13. I was obliged to respond to the patient, who deserved a treatment but did not get it. 
14. I was forced to deny an appropriate treatment from a patient due to budget cuts. 
15. I was forced to move a patient to an unsuitable department instead of providing 
her/him an appropriate treatment in my department. 
 
The measure was adapted from Lev, Sagit, Ayalon (2018)  
1. I acted in a way which has been in contradiction to my professional beliefs due to 
pressures by the institution’s management. 
2. I confronted the staff when I perceived their behavior as being in contradiction with the 
best interests of the residents. 
3. There were situations in which I felt that my professional obligation to the residents 
was in contradiction with the financial interest of the institution. 
4. I acted in a manner which I perceived as being in the best interests of the residents, 
even when it was in contradiction with the demands of the institution’s management. 
5. I had difficulty handling, in a professional manner, situations of suspected abuse in the 
workplace towards residents, due to the lack of cooperation or opposition by the staff. 
6. There were situations in which I felt that the interest of the institution’s management 
was in contradiction with the interest of the residents. 
7. I felt that in situations of suspected abuse towards residents, the management acted 
only superficially and not to purposefully eradicate the violence interests of the residents. 
8. I felt that my personal and environmental resources have not been adequate in order to 
protect the residents’ rights. 
9. I confronted the institution’s management when I perceived its conduct as being in 
contradiction with the best interests of the residents. 
10. I felt that I have not had sufficient capacity to influence the imposition of sanctions 
on a worker who behaved in an inappropriate way towards residents. 
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11. I felt that I do not have sufficient capacity to work to find an alternate framework for 
residents, even though in my professional opinion an institutional framework is not 
suitable for them, due to the opposition of the institution’s management. 
12. I felt that there has been an expectation of me to conceal or to give false information 
in situations where there is suspicion of abuse. 
13. I acted in a way which was in contradiction with my professional beliefs due to 
concerns of losing my job. 
14. I felt criticism from the staff when I advocated on behalf of family members and/or 
residents. 
15. I felt that in my professional work, I have been more driven by the financial 
considerations of the institution than by considerations for the best interest of the 
residents. 
16. I had difficulty handling, in a professional manner, situations of suspected abuse 
towards residents, due to lack of cooperation or opposition by the institution’s 
management. 
17. I acted in a way which I perceived as being in the best interests of the residents, even 








APPENDIX C – A Measure of Perceived Occupational Stigma 
Measure by Schaubroeck et al. (2018) 
Please consider the extent to which each statement applies to your job in general. 
Response Scale: 
 
1= Strongly disagree 
2= Disagree    
3= Slightly Disagree 
4= Neither agree nor disagree     
5= Slightly Agree 
6= Agree 
7= Strongly agree 
 
1. Most people would not want to associate themselves with a job like mine. 
2. Few people would be proud to have my job. 
3. Most people would consider my occupation disgusting or degrading. 
4. People in my occupation are devalued by others. 






APPENDIX D – A Measure of Mental Health Symptoms 
Patient Health Questionnaire by Spitzer, Williams, Kroenke (1999) 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Measure by Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams, and Lowe 
(2006) 




1= Not at all 
2= Several days 
3= More than half of the days 
4= Nearly every day 
Items indicated with a * assess anxiety. 
1. Little interest or pleasure in doing things.    
2. Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless.    
3. Trouble falling or staying asleep or sleeping too much.    
4. Feeling tried or having little energy.    
5. Poor appetite or overeating.    
6. Feeling bad about yourself - or that you are a failure or have let yourself or your family 
down. 
7. Trouble concentrating on things such as reading the newspaper or watching television.    
8. Moving or speaking so slowly that other people have noticed? Or the opposite - being 
so fidgety or restless that you have been moving around a lot more than usual.    
9. Thoughts that you would be better off dead or hurting yourself in some way.  
*10. Feeling nervous, anxious or on edge.    
*11. Not being able to stop or control worrying.    
*12. Trouble relaxing.    
*13. Worrying too much about different things.    
*14. Being so restless that it is hard to sit still.    
*15. Becoming easily annoyed or irritable.    
*16. Feeling afraid as if something awful might happen.   
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APPENDIX E – A Measure of Meaningful work 
Measure by Steger, Dik, and Duffy (2012) 
Please respond to the items using the scale below. 
Response Scale: 
 
1= Definitely Untrue 
2= Probably Untrue 
3= Neither True nor Untrue 
4= Probably True 
5= Definitely True 
 
1. I have found a meaningful career 
2. I understand how my work contributes to my life’s meaning 
3. I have a good sense of what makes my job meaningful. 
4. I have discovered work that has a satisfying purpose. 
5. I view my work as contributing to my personal growth. 
6. My work helps me better understand myself. 
7. My work helps me make sense of the world around me. 
8. My work really makes no difference to the world. (R) 
9. I know my work makes a positive difference in the world. 




APPENDIX F – A Measure of Workplace Deviance 
Measure by Bennett and Robinson (2000) 
Please indicate the extent to which you have engaged in each of the behaviors in the last 
3 months.  
Frequency Response Scale: 
1= Never, have no experience 
2= Rarely, once over the three months    
3= Sometimes, more than once over the three months     
4= Often, every month 
5= Very often, every week 
6= Always, everyday 
1. Taken property from work without permission 
2. Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working 
3. Falsified a receipt to get reimbursed for more money than you spent on business 
expenses 
4. Taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace 
5. Come in late to work without permission 
6. Littered your work environment 
7. Neglected to follow your boss's instructions 
8. Intentionally worked slower than you could have worked 
9. Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person 
10. Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job 
11. Put little effort into your work 
12. Dragged out work in order to get overtime 
13. Made fun of someone at work 
14. Said something hurtful to someone at work 
15. Made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark at work 
16. Cursed at someone at work 
17. Played a mean prank on someone at work 
18. Acted rudely toward someone at work 






    
 
 
Frequency of endorsement of moral suffering experiences   
Item No. Moral Suffering Experience Frequency Percent 
t1_MI1 I have witnessed actions taken by management in my organization that 
betrayed my trust. 
226 47% 
t1_MI2 I have seen people taking revenge for actions that have happened at work. 150 31% 
t1_MI3 I have failed to protect someone at work from unnecessary harm. 55 11% 
t1_MI4 I have seen someone unnecessarily harmed at work. 108 23% 
t1_MI5 I have been able to leave my work psychologically or physically safe 
when I know others at work cannot. 
226 47% 
t1_MI6 I failed to take action in helping someone at work. 168 35% 
t1_MI7 I saw a coworker engage in actions that I did not agree with. 355 74% 
t1_MI8 I have not had access to the resources or materials I needed to do my job 
in a way that protected other people at work. 
179 37% 
t1_MI9 I have seen people at work suffer because of actions involving other 
employees at my organization. 
246 51% 
t1_MI10 I saw mistakes made by my coworkers or other employees that led to 
other people suffering at work. 
261 54% 
t1_MD1 I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’ directions, 
which were against my professional opinion. 
200 42% 
t1_MD2 I have considered whether to bend the rules to do something that I 
believed was right despite being against the organization’s rules. 
225 47% 
t1_MD3 I have been forced to do my job according to my organization’s 
protocols, which were against my professional opinion. 
195 41% 
t1_MD4 I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’ directions 
and against my conscience. 
166 35% 
t1_MD5 I have been forced to relocate/redistribute my work to 
somewhere/someone else that I believed was unsuitable. 
155 32% 
t1_MD6 There have been situations where I believed management's interests were 
in contradiction with the purpose of my work 
243 51% 
t1_MD7 I have seen coworkers behave in contradiction with the best interests of 
our clients/patients/customers 
292 61% 
t1_MD8 There have been situations where management has acted superficially and 
did not serve the best interests of clients/patients/customers 
261 54% 
t1_MD9 I have seen a colleague behave in an inappropriate way at work that I did 
not have the ability to prevent 
265 55% 
t1_MD10 I was in a situation where there was an expectation for me to conceal or 
to give false information. 
116 24% 
    
Note. Responses were coded as (0) having never experienced that item or (1) experienced that item 









Table 2  
  
 
Principal axis factor analysis for the moral suffering measurement model   
Item No. Moral Suffering Experience F1 F2 
t1_MI1 I have witnessed actions taken by management in my organization that 
betrayed my trust. 
 
.41 
t1_MI2 I have seen people taking revenge for actions that have happened at work. .45 
 
t1_MI3 I have failed to protect someone at work from unnecessary harm. .98 
 
t1_MI4 I have seen someone unnecessarily harmed at work. .71 
 
t1_MI5 I have been able to leave my work psychologically or physically safe when I 
know others at work cannot. 
.66 
 
t1_MI6 I failed to take action in helping someone at work. .70 
 
t1_MI7 I saw a coworker engage in actions that I did not agree with. 
 
.78 
t1_MI8 I have not had access to the resources or materials I needed to do my job in a 
way that protected other people at work. 
.62 
 
t1_MI9 I have seen people at work suffer because of actions involving other 
employees at my organization. 
 
.63 
t1_MI10 I saw mistakes made by my coworkers or other employees that led to other 
people suffering at work. 
 
.64 
t1_MD1 I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’ directions, 
which were against my professional opinion. 
.54 
 
t1_MD2 I have considered whether to bend the rules to do something that I believed 
was right despite being against the organization’s rules. 
.81 
 
t1_MD3 I have been forced to do my job according to my organization’s protocols, 
which were against my professional opinion. 
.65 
 
t1_MD4 I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’ directions and 
against my conscience. 
.78 
 
t1_MD5 I have been forced to relocate/redistribute my work to somewhere/someone 
else that I believed was unsuitable. 
.54 
 
t1_MD6 There have been situations where I believed management's interests were in 
contradiction with the purpose of my work 
 
.57 




t1_MD8 There have been situations where management has acted superficially and did 
not serve the best interests of clients/patients/customers 
 
.67 
t1_MD9 I have seen a colleague behave in an inappropriate way at work that I did not 
have the ability to prevent 
 
.63 
t1_MD10 I was in a situation where there was an expectation for me to conceal or to 
give false information. 
.68 
 
Note. Principal axis factor analysis was conducted with promax rotation and robust maximum likelihood 











    
    
Factor loadings from the confirmatory factor analysis of the final moral suffering model 
Item No. Moral Suffering Perpetration Witness 
t1_MI1B I have witnessed actions taken by management in my organization 
that betrayed my trust. 
 
0.68 
t1_MI3B I have failed to protect someone at work from unnecessary harm. 0.65 
 
t1_MI7B I saw a coworker engage in actions that I did not agree with. 
 
0.75 
t1_MI8B I have not had access to the resources or materials I needed to do my 
job in a way that protected other people at work. 
0.68 
 
t1_MI9B I have seen people at work suffer because of actions involving other 
employees at my organization. 
 
0.72 
t1_MI10B I saw mistakes made by my coworkers or other employees that led to 
other people suffering at work. 
 
0.75 
t1_MD1B I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’ 
directions, which were against my professional opinion. 
0.83 
 
t1_MD2B I have considered whether to bend the rules to do something that I 
believed was right despite being against the organization’s rules. 
0.82 
 
t1_MD3B I have been forced to do my job according to my organization’s 
protocols, which were against my professional opinion. 
0.85 
 
t1_MD4B I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’ 
directions and against my conscience. 
0.84 
 
t1_MD5B I have been forced to relocate/redistribute my work to 
somewhere/someone else that I believed was unsuitable. 
0.64 
 
t1_MD6B There have been situations where I believed management's interests 
were in contradiction with the purpose of my work 
 
0.8 
t1_MD7B I have seen coworkers behave in contradiction with the best interests 
of our clients/patients/customers 
 
0.76 
t1_MD8B There have been situations where management has acted 




t1_MD9B I have seen a colleague behave in an inappropriate way at work that I 
did not have the ability to prevent 
 
0.67 
t1_MD10B I was in a situation where there was an expectation for me to conceal 
or to give false information. 
0.66 
 
Note. The CFA was conducted using robust maximum likelihood estimators. Items MI2, MI4, MI5, and MI6 
were removed from the final model. The confirmatory factor analysis was conducted with the second split 




Table 4        
Factor loadings from the confirmatory factor analysis of the moral suffering product scores final model  
Item No. Moral Suffering Perpetration Witness 
t1_MI1 I have witnessed actions taken by management in my organization that 
betrayed my trust. 
 
0.77 
t1_MI3 I have failed to protect someone at work from unnecessary harm. 0.72 
 
t1_MI7 I saw a coworker engage in actions that I did not agree with. 
 
0.78 
t1_MI8 I have not had access to the resources or materials I needed to do my 
job in a way that protected other people at work. 
0.68 
 
t1_MI9 I have seen people at work suffer because of actions involving other 
employees at my organization. 
 
0.79 
t1_MI10 I saw mistakes made by my coworkers or other employees that led to 
other people suffering at work. 
 
0.78 
t1_MD1 I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’ 
directions, which were against my professional opinion. 
0.9 
 
t1_MD2 I have considered whether to bend the rules to do something that I 
believed was right despite being against the organization’s rules. 
0.88 
 
t1_MD3 I have been forced to do my job according to my organization’s 
protocols, which were against my professional opinion. 
0.87 
 
t1_MD4 I have been forced to do my job according to my supervisors’ 
directions and against my conscience. 
0.88 
 
t1_MD5 I have been forced to relocate/redistribute my work to 
somewhere/someone else that I believed was unsuitable. 
0.73 
 
t1_MD6 There have been situations where I believed management's interests 
were in contradiction with the purpose of my work 
 
0.89 
t1_MD7 I have seen coworkers behave in contradiction with the best interests 
of our clients/patients/customers 
 
0.82 
t1_MD8 There have been situations where management has acted superficially 
and did not serve the best interests of clients/patients/customers 
 
0.86 
t1_MD9 I have seen a colleague behave in an inappropriate way at work that I 
did not have the ability to prevent 
 
0.74 
t1_MD10 I was in a situation where there was an expectation for me to conceal 
or to give false information. 
0.77 
 
Note. The CFA was conducted using robust maximum likelihood estimators. Items MI2, MI4, MI5, and MI6 
were removed from the final model. The confirmatory factor analysis was conducted with the second split half 




          
Fit statistics for the final measurement models of the latent study variables 
  Wave N ꭓ2 df RMSEA SRMR CFI TLI 
Moral Suffering Product Model 1 349 195.218 101 0.079 0.041 0.954 0.945 
Perceived Occupational Stigma 1 479 44.798 5 0.189 0.055 0.942 0.883 
Mental Health Symptoms 2 479 253.316 88 0.082 0.048 0.950 0.941 
Meaningful Work 2 479 97.711 24 0.101 0.022 0.977 0.965 
Note. Fit statistics shown for CFAs of all study variables (latent only) at all relevant waves. Moral suffering 
measurement model was based on the split half sample (N = 349) and utilized the product term of 
frequency*intensity scores. 
  
Table 6                             
                              
Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations among study variables 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Control Variables                            
1.  Age 40.56 10.98 -            
2.  Tenure 7.71 7.28 .47** -           
Time 1               
3.   Witness 5.38 6.41 0.01 -0.01 (.91)          
4.   Perpetration 2.01 3.23 -.11* -0.05 .34** (.89)         
5.   POS 2.41 1.64 0.05 -0.01 .40** .27** (.89)        
6.   MW 3.74 1.18 0.07 .16** -.32** -.10* -.36** (.95)       
7.   CWB 1.25 0.69 -.11* -0.04 .31** .52** .25** -0.07 (.93)      
8.   MHS 1.66 0.84 -0.05 -0.05 .41** .25** .31** -.43** .31** (.95)     
Time 2               
9.   POS 2.43 1.57 0.04 0.02 .35** .22** .59** -.33** .23** .21** (.91)    
10. MW 3.74 1.16 0.08 .18** -.28** -0.05 -.31** .80** -0.05 -.38** -.36** (.95)   
11. CWB 1.22 0.64 -0.09 -0.04 .21** .41** .26** -0.04 .60** .23** .25** -0.06 (.94)  
12. MHS 1.64 0.81 -.10* -0.06 .34** .22** .32** -.37** .22** .73** .25** -.40** .26** (.95) 
Note. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respectively.  Values in parentheses in the diagonal represent Cronbach's alpha. POS 
refers to perceived occupational stigma (responses ranged from 1-7), MW refers to meaningful work (responses ranged from 1-5), CWB refers to 
counterproductive work behaviors (responses ranged from 1-6), and MHS refers to mental health symptoms (responses ranged from 1-4). Witness- and 
perpetration-based moral suffering refers to the frequency*intensity product scores.  
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 Table 7           
            
Regression estimates for the structural models of moral suffering predicting outcomes (H1 - 3) 





1 Mental Health Symptoms ~ Witness-Based .42** .14 .38 Perpetration-Based .06 .14 .05 
2 Meaningful Work ~ Witness-Based -.37** .13 -.36 Perpetration-Based .14 .13 .14 
3 Counterproductive Work Behaviors ~ 
Witness-Based -.07 .07 -.11 
Perpetration-Based .24** .09 .38 
Note. All predictors were assessed at Time 1 and all dependent variables were assessed at Time 2. The predictors 
were calculated using the product term of frequency*intensity scores. 
~ indicates "regressed on" 





Table 8      
   
   
Regression estimates for the structural models of the interaction between moral suffering and perceived 
occupational stigma predicting outcomes (H4-6) 
Hypothesis Regression Estimate Standard Error 
Standardized 
Estimate 
4 Mental Health Symptoms ~  
Witness-Based .72** .26 .58 
Perpetration-Based 1.04** .37 .84 
POS .98** .26 .79 
WBMS X POS -.85* .39 -.68 
PBMS X POS -.95** .33 -.76 
5 Meaningful Work ~  
Witness-Based -.20 .20 -.18 
Perpetration-Based -.57* .28 -.51 
POS -.73** .18 -.66 
WBMS X POS .19 .29 .17 
PBMS X POS .73** .23 .65 
6 Counterproductive Work Behaviors ~  
Witness-Based .04 .09 .06 
Perpetration-Based .29 .17 .46 
POS .28* .12 .44 
WBMS X POS -.25 .17 -.39 
PBMS X POS -.06 .17 -.09 
Note. All predictors were assessed at Time 1 and all dependent variables were assessed at Time 2. The moral 
suffering predictors were calculated using the product term of frequency*intensity scores. WBMS refers to witness-
based moral suffering, PBMS refers to perpetration-based moral suffering, and POS refers to perceived 
occupational stigma. 
~ indicates "regressed on" 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
 
